Three Essays in Applied Economics:Social Insurance by Junge, Martin
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Three Essays in Applied Economics
Junge, Martin
Publication date:
2007
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Junge, M. (2007). Three Essays in Applied Economics: Social Insurance. Department of Economics, University
of Copenhagen. Rød Serie, No. 122
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
PhD Thesis No. 153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three Essays in Applied Economics: Social Insurance 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Martin Junge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2007 
Department of Economics  
University of Copenhagen 
Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen 
www.econ.ku.dk 
Three Essays in Applied Economics: Social Insurance 
 
By Martin Junge 
Table of Contents 
 
Preface  
 
Acknowledgement  
 
Chapter 1………………. An Econometric Model of Early or Ordinary Retirement in Denmark  
 
Chapter 2…………………..….. The Interaction of Long-term Unemployment and Retirement  
 
Chapter 3…………………………… Labour supply in an economy with a generous UI system 
 
2
Preface 
 
This thesis contains three chapters. They are interrelated; but they can be read 
independently. Chapter 1 and 2 have in common the focus of old age insurance and 
chapter 2 and 3 are interrelated by the focus on unemployment insurance. All three 
chapters are connected to the analysis of social insurance. Here we briefly discuss the 
topic of social insurance and the methodology applied in the chapters before turning to 
a brief summary of each chapter. 
 
Social insurance is concerned with government provision of unemployed, disabled or 
old-age. It is financed by employers, employees and government. The institutions that 
provide social insurance vary a great deal across countries in the world. Al this 
underlines that as a research field social insurance is very broad and complex. Social 
insurance influences and distorts decisions of those who receive and pay for it. Social 
insurance affects people and especially those at risk of loosing their basic income 
resource, human capital. Securing the income base, however, is identical with an 
efficiency cost in the form of ‘potential’ moral hazard problems as social insurance 
crowd out private insurance or reduces labour supply. This makes it a very fascinating 
and essential research topic. This thesis only deals with certain aspects of social 
insurance. Chapter 1 and 2 are devoted to old age insurance, while chapter 3 is devoted 
to unemployment insurance. 
 
The analytical framework in this paper is that of neoclassical theory and empirical 
measurement. We embed individual behaviour in computational models that are 
abstractions of reality. In particular, we will assume that individuals are rational and 
pursue individual interests i.e. maximizing consumption and leisure bundles under a 
budget constraint. The question that is frequently asked in this thesis is how large is the 
distortion induced by social insurance on leisure/labour supply? Further can existing 
policy proposals alleviate some of the distortions? In each chapter we devote a section 
to evaluations of the various trade-offs involved in setting social insurance policy. 
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Social insurance involves a complex rule set. Oftentimes multiple welfare programs 
exist and individuals can choose between the programs (e.g. unemployment insurance 
or social assistance). Moreover ‘grandfathering’ effects are frequently in effect, which 
makes the choice set very different across cohorts. The resulting budget set has kinks, 
holes and corners, which makes empirical models very complex. The thesis gets around 
these obstacles in a ‘standard’ way by imposing an additional restriction that choices 
are discrete. The standard first order conditions from neoclassical theory are therefore 
replaced by a series of inequality restrictions. 
 
In Chapter 1 we estimate the effect of social security and early retirement eligibility and 
benefit on retirement in Denmark in a reduced form discrete choice model. Due to the 
endogeneity of early retirement eligibility, we estimate the eligibility condition 
simultaneously with the discrete choice of retirement by a bivariate probit model. The 
retirement equation allows the error term to picking up missing variables, unobserved 
heterogeneity and possible problems with the time-stamping of retirement and age. We 
use variation from major social security and early retirement reforms as well as minor 
year-to-year changes in actual social security and early retirement rules from 1980 to 
1996 in a micro simulation model to compute the present value of social security 
wealth. This incentive measure enters into the retirement decision and also affects 
eligibility. Exogenous changes in the retirement programs are necessary for 
identification of incentives. We use a data set compiled from administrative registers in 
Denmark. First, we find that eligibility is endogenous. Second, public provided support 
in old age is an important predictor of retirement, but is not influenced much by 
eligibility to early retirement or serial correlation in the error terms. However, other 
variables, e.g. age and health, are more sensitive to these. Policy simulation reveals an 
important effect of retirement route choice on average retirement age, which is not 
considered in other studies. 
 
In Chapter 2 we are modelling and estimating the joint process of exiting from the 
labour market through unemployment and retirement. Unemployment is a common pre-
retirement state and around 25 per cent of transitions to retirement at age 60 are from 
(long-term) unemployment. Despite the large amount of unemployment prior to 
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retirement it is surprising that unemployment is not more widespread as the 
unemployment insurance scheme is more generous than the early retirement scheme. 
The model is a dynamic discrete choice model with imperfect control. It is estimated 
using maximum likelihood on a sample of workers, whose main retirement income is 
public provided support. Individuals maximize remaining lifetime utility. In each 
period, they control their labour market state by choosing between unemployment, 
retirement or full time work. The control is imperfect in the sense that the decision to 
stay in a given job can be overruled by a layoff, which is modelled as a function of 
creative destruction in plants. Utility is derived from income and leisure and includes 
taste shifters. The value of leisure varies across unemployment and retirement due to 
the absence of search requirements in retirement. The model incorporates the social 
insurance system in detail, which induces dynamic incentives, e.g., duration dependent 
benefits and an interaction between the unemployment benefit level and early 
retirement benefits. Moreover wages depend on the history of labour supply, general 
human capital (experience) and firm specific human capital (tenure). The results of the 
paper points at very large search cost for the unemployed, though search also reduces 
cost of getting a new job. Simulation with the model shows that unemployment related 
retirement schemes can be extremely popular even at low economic incentives. 
Moreover, we compute individual’s willingness to pay for an unemployment scheme 
without search cost. For the unemployed, we find, they are willing to live close to 
subsistence level. 
 
In Chapter 3 the emphasis is on the need to allow for considerable heterogeneity in the 
distaste for work that is correlated with productivity when considering the design of a 
UI system. The Danish UI system is – for low wage workers – very generous. Six 
months of work entitles low wage individuals to 30 months of UI benefit at 90% of 
their wage. By any standards this is likely to distort incentives. First, workers who 
would normally work all the time have strong incentives to cut back work substantially. 
Second, workers, who would not normally work, have strong incentives to work for six 
month to entitle themselves to UI benefit. Despite the generosity, we find that a very 
large proportion of our sample of low wage single male workers works most of the time 
and that a substantial fraction works 6 months. In a simple labour supply model we can 
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only rationalize this by posting substantial heterogeneity on preferences. The analysis 
suggest that preferences are bimodal.  
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 An Econometric Model of Early or Ordinary Retirement in Denmark 
Version 1 
Martin Junge1 
Centre for Economic Business Research, CBS  
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen 
 
Abstract: This paper we model the discrete choice of retirement using a fully 
parametric model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, serial correlation in the 
error terms and endogeneity of the eligibility to early retirement. We use a data set 
compiled from administrative registers in Denmark. First, we find that eligibility is 
endogenous.  Second, public provided support in old age is an important predictor of 
retirement, but is not influenced much by eligibility to early retirement or serial 
correlation in the error terms. However, other variables, e.g. age and health, are more 
sensitive to these. Policy simulation reveals an important effect of retirement route 
choice on average retirement age, which is often not considered in other studies. 
  
 
 
Keywords: Retirement, social security, panel data, bivariate probit. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The Author would like to thank Martin Browning, Ulrich Kaiser, Hans Christian Konsted and Nikolaj 
Malchow-Møller for valuable comments.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper estimates the effect of social security and early retirement eligibility and 
benefit on retirement in Denmark in a reduced form discrete choice model. Due to the 
endogeneity of early retirement eligibility, we estimate the eligibility condition 
simultaneously with the discrete choice of retirement by a bivariate probit model. The 
retirement equation allows the error term to picking up missing variables, unobserved 
heterogeneity and possible problems with the time-stamping of retirement and age. 
We use variation from major social security and early retirement reforms as well as 
minor year-to-year changes in actual social security and early retirement rules from 
1980 to 1996 in a micro simulation model to compute the present value of social 
security wealth. This incentive measure enters into the retirement decision and also 
affects eligibility. Exogenous changes in the retirement programs are necessary for 
identification of incentives. 
 
The Danish labour force participation rate for elderly workers is high by international 
standards both today, in the 1980’s and in the beginning of the 1990’s, the period 
considered in this paper. Two main reasons for this exist. First, Danish women have 
had a high participation rate in the labour market for many years, starting in the 
fifties. Second, the normal retirement age was 67 years in the period under 
investigation, which is high compared to other countries. Policy makers and 
economists today are, however, concerned about the future fiscal balance (The 
Economic Council (“Det Økonomiske Råd”) 2005; The Danish Welfare Commission 
(“Velfærdskommissionen“, 2006). The average retirement age, about 61 years of age, 
is much lower than the official normal retirement age, which is mainly due to a very 
generous early retirement scheme enacted in 1979. 
 
Retirement has been studied extensively in the literature for the last two decades. An 
important result of existing studies is that publicly provided old age insurance is an 
important predictor of retirement. Other important factors that determine retirement 
have also been identified, such as wealth, health and Medicare2 (in countries where 
this is an issue), and labour market opportunities. It is of utmost importance for 
                                                          
2 Medicare is not relevant in Denmark as hospitals and doctors are free and prescription drugs and other 
treatments are either public available or largely subsidized. 
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economic policy to obtaining reliable estimates of the empirical magnitude of these 
effects in order to design an optimal retirement policy. 
 
The literature relevant for this study mostly uses reduced form analysis of the “pull 
effects” of social security and early retirement benefit. Stock et al., 1990, find strong 
and significant effects of variables measuring the incentives of firms’ pension plans, 
e.g. the option value of postponing retirement. In the option value model an individual 
continues to work if the expected value of retirement in the future is worth more than 
the value of retirement today. The option value approach has been widely used in 
many papers for different countries and for various retirement routes (see i.e. NBER 
volumes by Gruber et al., 1998 and Gruber et al., 2005). In most, if not all of these 
studies, the incentive measure and declining labour force participation rates are 
strongly correlated. A very closely related incentive measure, the “peak value”, was 
introduced by Coile et al., 2000. The peak value measures the difference between 
maximum expected social security wealth of the future and social security wealth 
today. It is hence the financial equivalent of the option value and can easily be 
computed by a micro simulation model with pension system rules. Coile et al. suggest 
entering this into a probit model with retirement decision as the dependent variable. 
 
Having established some of it successes the literature has not matured yet. First, it is 
often the case that retirement routes are multiple. Thus, there can be endogeneity 
involved in the retirement route. The response to this issue in the reduced form 
literature has been to estimate the take up rate and use these as weights in estimating 
expected social security wealth (Börsch-Supan, 1999). The leading example is 
disability pensions, which are restricted to the disabled. First, the screening process is 
seldom observed, which makes this route partial observed. Second, individuals might 
influence the outcome in this process as discussed by Börsch-Supan. As Börsch-
Supan notes, the estimation of take up rates and applying the weights to aggregation 
across retirement routes can be seen as an instrumental variable procedure. But, the 
literature does not discuss identifying assumptions or provide a test for whether 
choice of route is endogenous. Exceptions do exist. For example Chan and Stevens, 
2004, estimate a model with forward looking incentives measures included as 
discussed above. Since their dependent variable is expected retirement age, they use a 
10
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fixed effect estimator. This can under certain simplifying assumption account for the 
endogeneity of choice of retirement route.  
 
Moreover, failure of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity can bias the incentive 
estimates. The pooled probit estimator in panel data is consistent; but inefficient then 
errors are dependent across time. The problem here, however, is more severe since 
retirement is often modelled as an absorbing state. While lagged dependent variables 
do not enter the equation directly, the absorbing state changes the model into a 
sequential choice model. It is known that parameters are biased in this model, if the 
errors are dependent (Maddala, 1983). Börsch-Supan, 1999, shows that the 
consequences can be severe.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on reduced form models of retirement by in 
two ways. First, we account for possible endogeneity of eligibility to early retirement. 
Eligibility requires long-term UI fund membership, which is voluntary in Denmark. 
Evidence of individuals timing their UI fund membership to become eligible for early 
retirement benefit is given in Ejrnæs et al., 2006. Long-term membership condition 
was tightened from 10 to 20 years in 1992. Some cohorts were unable to meet the new 
requirements. Instead they could become eligible to early retirement, if they joined the 
UI funds immediately. The result was a large increase in UI fund members. We model 
eligibility to early retirement in a separate equation, which leads to a bivariate probit 
model, where it is possible to test for endogeneity of eligibility of early retirement. 
 
Second, we account for unobserved heterogeneity by estimation of a probit model 
with a flexible error structure. Since consistent estimates are obtained in the pooled 
probit model, this is rarely done in practice. However, the optimal stopping 
assumption in the retirement literature changes the problem into a sequential choice 
model. It is well known that this model give biased estimates if we do not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity (Maddala, 1983). The same problem is recognized by 
Börsch-Supan, 1999, who estimates the model with an AR(1) error and an random 
effect. He finds that the parameters changes dramatically, if the more sophisticated 
error structure is used, which has not had an influence on the literature following this 
paper. Therefore, it is of some interest to repeat Börsch-Supan on flexible error 
structure. We have generalized the error to an ARMA(1,1) model. The MA(1) error 
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term allows correlation between two consecutive periods to pick up problems with i.e. 
time-stamping. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we give an overview of the institutional 
setting of the Danish social security system in Section 2. We also discuss the recent 
reform and suggest a way to looking at these from a simulation perspective. In 
Section 3, the econometric model is derived. Section 4 discusses sample selection 
issues and we define eligibility to early retirement and retirement. In Section 5 we lay 
out the micro simulation model we use. Description of retirement and eligibility is 
done in Section 6. Results are presented in Section 7, and before wrapping up in 
Section 9, we simulate two fictive policy proposals in Section 8. 
 
2 Institutional setting 
This section focuses on normal retirement, early retirement and eligibility conditions 
for early retirement,3 which are relevant for this paper. The description of the 
institutional settings relates to the period 1980 to 1996 which also is the period we 
have data for. Since the 1999 reform of early retirement is part of our policy analysis, 
we will touch upon this in the end of this section. 
 
Normal retirement or old-age-pension (“folkepension”) is provided from the age of 
sixty-seven. It is a two-tier universal provided scheme, consisting of a base amount 
which is means tested against earnings and a supplement which is means tested 
against household income. Before 1993, the base amount was untested. Obtaining the 
full amount of old-age pension requires at least forty years of residence in Denmark. 
Shorter residence periods reduce the amount proportionally. The system does not 
depend on previous work history and is only residence and age based. Historically, 
couples and singles have received different amounts.  Delaying retirement does not 
lead to an adjustment of future benefits. Therefore, the old age schemes induce large 
incentives for retirement at age 67. The system is financed through general taxes.  
 
Disability pension (“førtidspension”) is based upon a rather complex set of rules. The 
main criterion for eligibility is reduced work ability. A reduction of at least fifty 
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percent is needed to qualify for that scheme. However, individuals aged 50 years and 
above may receive disability pension for social reasons. Delaying retirement does not 
increase future benefits and therefore no actuarial fair adjustment takes place. Benefits 
are more or less comparable with old age pensions except that work reduces benefit. 
  
The main route for early retirement (“efterløn”) was enacted in 1979. Eligibility is 
gained through membership of unemployment insurance funds (UI). It is worth noting 
UI membership is voluntary in Denmark. It is organized by trade unions; but 
membership in a trade union is, however, not required. A fund exists for all workers 
in the private sector.  
 
The main rules for eligibility to early retirement are first entitlement to UI benefit, 
which requires six months of work within the last 36 months. Second, a long period of 
membership is needed. This eligibility criterion has been tightened throughout the 
years. In the 1980’s, ten years of membership within the previous 15 years were a 
condition for eligibility. For individuals born before May 1, 1930, only five years of 
membership within the previous ten years where required. This requirement was 
tightened to 20 of the previous 25 years in 1992. From the beginning of the 1990’s, 
the work requirement (six months within last 36 months) was abolished for 
individuals older than 50 years. These eligibility criteria were meant to target a group 
with a long service life on the labour market  
 
The early retirement benefit level has also changed in the sample period. In the early 
period it was 90 percent of previous earnings, up to some maximum level of 
approximately 100,000 DKK in 1980 per year. The maximum is reduced to 80 
percent after 30 months. After an additional 24 months, the maximum is reduced to 70 
percent of the initial maximum level. The latter reduction was abolished in 1989. It is 
possible to maintain the maximum level from age 63 to 67 if the application for early 
retirement is delayed to age 63 since 1993. Finally, the amount of work allowed for 
individuals in this scheme has been rather strict, allowing for 200 hours per year. 
Furthermore, leaving the scheme meant that it was impossible to rejoin at a later date. 
Some of these restrictions were lifted in the beginning of the 1990’s. Part time early 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 The social security system and other retirement routes in Denmark are reviewed in detail by Bingley 
et al. (2002). 
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retirement was introduced and it was possible to re-enter once after a period of 
employment. The benefit is individual-based and does not depend on other household 
income. 
 
The three routes to retirement are modelled in this paper. These constituted the most 
important pension options for two thirds of the labour force (Bingley et al., 2002) in 
the 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s. Some public employees could draw a 
civil servants pension after a long period in civil service. Some individuals with an 
academic degree additionally had savings in labour market pensions. For details about 
these groups, see Bingley et al., 2002. These groups will be excluded from our 
analysis. 
 
In the future, the labour market pensions are expected to gaining importantance, as 
they have spread to larger groups in the labour market. Though projections from the 
Danish Welfare Commission (“Velfærdskommissionen”) show that labour market 
pensions will only be the dominant source of old-age income in the highest income 
deciles in 2030 (The Danish Welfare Commission, 2006). Hence, publicly provided 
pension programmes will remain constituting the most important retirement scheme. 
Finally, note that private firm pension schemes are almost non-existent in Denmark. 
 
In the policy scenario in Section 8 we will look at the early retirement reform in 1999. 
It is interesting, as at several points it changed the dynamic incentive structure. First, 
the period of UI fund membership was extended from 20 years to 25 years. In 
addition a contribution must be paid of approximately 4500 DKK in 1999 in each 
year. The ordinary retirement age was decreased from age 67 to 65. If retirement is 
postponed to after age 62 a tax credit is allowed at age 65. This credit is incremented 
for each 3 months of postponed retirement. Finally, the benefit level is 90 percent of 
maximum UI for those who retire before age 62. It is 100 per cent of maximum UI for 
those who retire at age 62 or later. 
 
3 Econometric model 
This section explains the econometric model. The left hand side variable is the 
discrete choice of retirement between age 59 and 71, where we assume that retirement 
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is an absorbing state. On the right hand side we include incentive measures calculated 
from actual rules from 1980 to 1996. As incentive measures we use social security 
wealth and peak value. We also add other explanatory variables like earnings, age, 
education, experience, gender, a proxy for health, cohabitation4, potential labour 
market experience and some measures of growth of employment within the plant 
individuals are employed as labour market shocks. Adding an unobserved iid normal 
distributed error generates the model of Coile et al., 2000. 
 
We extend the model in two directions. The first direction is to extend the error term 
and account for unobserved heterogeneity, missing variables and problems with the 
dating of events. The second direction is to model eligibility to early retirement. This 
formulation leads to a discrete choice model with a dummy endogenous variable. The 
eligibility to early retirement is decided before retirement and we model eligibility to 
early retirement at age 59. The left hand side variable is eligibility at age 59 (see 
“Data” section for how eligibility is computed), and on the right hand side we include 
potential social security wealth, earnings, gender, occupation, industry, education, 
experience, a proxy for health, cohabitation, and measures of growth of employment 
within the plant individuals are employed. 
 
Serial correlation and random effects in the panel probit selection model is often 
ignored. The main reason is that consistent, though inefficient, parameter estimates 
can be obtained without modeling the correlation in errors (Bertschek et al., 1998). 
Since we treat retirement as absorbing, the model essentially is a sequential choice 
model. Ignoring serial correlation hence leads to biased estimates which are one 
reason for including the flexible errors in this model (Maddala, 1983). To pick up 
unobserved heterogeneity and missing variables we include an AR(1) error and a 
random effect.  
 
Another issue is that eligibility is dependent on age and the correct measurement of 
the timing of retirement becomes crucial. One problem here is that retirement is 
decided on the basis of income source type and labor supply in November each year 
whereas age is calculated as an individual’s age at the end of each year. It is therefore 
                                                          
4 The variable “cohabitation” will be used throughout the paper. It covers both married and cohabiting 
couples. 
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likely that we find a correlation in the error terms across two periods. It might also be 
the case that it is difficult for some individuals to explicitly time their year of 
retirement due to employment contracts. We therefore include an MA(1) term as well.  
 
This final error structure is an ARMA(1,1) with time invariant random effects that 
leads to a multidimensional integral as we have 13 (age) periods, that needs to be 
integrated out. Fortunately, recent developments in estimation by simulation can solve 
these problems (Hajivassiliou et al., 1994). 
 
Discrete models with dummy endogenous variable are quite common in economics.5 
The common reference for estimation of this model is Heckman, 1978. Due to the 
presence of a dummy endogenous variables full information maximum likelihood are 
usually applied. Other methods exist, however. Angrist, 2000, for example suggests 
using instrumental variables in limited dependent variable models with dummy 
endogenous variables. Another approach uses natural experiments, which constitutes 
another option (see Krueger et al., 1992, on retirement). We use full information 
maximum likelihood. Identification of the model is achieved through functional form 
assumptions regarding the error terms, though it is common practice to have some 
exclusion restrictions to make it more robust towards misspecification of the error 
term. 
 
More specific we formulate the retirement equation as:  
 
* 1 0 1 0 11 ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) ) 0
0
ssw peak
it it it it it it it it it it it it
it
y if y e ssw e ssw e peak e peak x
y otherwise
β β β ε′= = + − + + − + + >
=
 
Where y* is a latent variable measuring the monetary value of retiring. We only 
observe whether this is positive or negative and hence yit is one or zero. eit is the 
endogenous dummy variable of eligibility, and sswj (peakj) is potential social security 
wealth (peak value) for ineligible and eligible to early retirement for j = 0, 1.  X is a 
vector of exogenous variables. The error term has the following structure: 
 
                                                          
5 A leading example is the influence of fertility on labour supply of women (see for example Carrasco, 
2002).  
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1 1
it it i
it it it it
ε λ υ
λ ρλ η θη− −
= +
= + +  
 
Where η and ν are iid normal distributed error terms and independent of X. From this 
and an assumption of stationarity, we can derive the covariance matrix as: 
 
2 2 2
itE λ υε σ σ⎡ ⎤ = +⎣ ⎦  
[ ] 2 21it itE λ υε ε ρσ θ σ− = + +  
2 2[ ] , 1kit it kE kλ υε ε ρ σ σ− = + >  
 
where 
2
2 2
2
1 2
1λ η
θ ρθσ σρ
+ += − . 
 
In a discrete choice model it is necessary to set the scale for identification. We impose 
2 2 1λ υσ σ+ = . 
 
Eligibility for early retirement has the following form 
 
*1 0
0
i i i i
i
e if e z
e otherwise
δ ς′= = + >
=  
 
Again e* reflects the latent value of being eligible to early retirement. We only 
observe whether e* is positive or negative through e. Z is a vector of exogenous 
variables. Note that eligibility is formulated as a cross section estimation at age fifty-
nine. In this respect, it is closely related to modelling initial conditions as we only 
consider retirement from age 59 to age 71. The error term is normalized to have 
variance 1, but is possibly correlated with the time-invariant error in the retirement 
equation, [ ]it iE εςε ς ρ= .  
 
With the formulation above, a fixed effects estimator of the retirement equation would 
wipe out all selection (due to time-invariance). However, probit models with fixed 
17
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effects are only in their infancy (Arrellano, 2005).6 Instead the random effects 
specification is only robust to selection if the random effect is uncorrelated with the 
participation error (Verbeek et al., 1992). By joint estimation of retirement and 
eligibility we can test for whether this correlation is significant. 
 
Even though the model is identified by functional form of the error terms, exclusion 
restrictions are often imposed to help identification. We propose the possibility of 
using individuals’ industry affiliation and occupation to explain retirement only 
through eligibility. The main idea is derived from Parson et al., 2003, where social 
pressure on UI fund membership differs across industries and occupation. However, in 
many studies industry affiliation and occupation has been an important predictor of 
retirement due to correlation with other determinants of retirement, i.e. the demand for 
labor and physical requirements of jobs. In the model we include measures of health 
and labor market shocks to capture some of these effects. Another exclusion restriction 
is potential social security wealth for eligible (ssw1). Since it only enters in the 
retirement equation for those with eit = 1. Another argument for the exclusion 
restrictions is that the eligibility condition is modeled at age 59 which is well below 
the average retirement age at 61.7 in the sample.  
 
The econometric model is estimated using simulation methods to solve the 
multidimensional integral in the likelihood function. We use the GHK simulator 
(Hajivasilliou et al., 1994). The procedure produces biased estimates unless the 
number of simulations goes to infinity. In practice, however, most researchers set the 
number of draws to 10. We also use 10 draws and uses antithetic variates, which is a 
variance reduction technique, implying a total of 20 draws. 
 
We estimate the simultaneous model and a number of simpler models nested within 
the simultaneous model. This allows for standard likelihood ratio test, also then we 
use simulation-based estimation (Hajivasilliou et al., 1994). The correlation between 
the error terms of eligibility, early retirement and ordinary retirement are of particular 
interest. 
                                                          
6 We experimented with using a conditional logit model. But the estimation was very unstable. If we 
excluded age and year variables and some of the other explanatory variables the model converges, but 
the results on incentive measures were very hard to understand. 
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A limitation of this model is first order serial correlation and random effects indicate 
omitted variables. Second, availability and test of exclusion restrictions are another 
potential problem. Moreover, we have excluded a number of important predictors of 
retirement, i.e. labour supply of spouses and lagged unemployment, since these are 
endogenous variables. This essentially means that they are partly absorbed by the 
error term. When we conduct policy simulations, these are performed conditional on 
policies that do not affect the error term, which leads to biased policy predictions.  
4 Description of retirement/eligibility and sample selection 
The data is compiled from various administrative registers in Denmark.7 Every person 
with a residence in Denmark has a personal ID number. This ID number is used for 
many types of transactions: paying taxes, receiving various government benefits, 
unemployment insurance, job centres, bank accounts, etc. Statistics Denmark has 
compiled a labour market database from some of these transactions (named “IDA”) 
and access for researchers and others can be granted. The database essentially covers 
the adult population in Denmark, but our data consists of a 10 percent random sample 
for 1980 (the first year of “IDA” data), and individuals are then followed to until 
today.8 These data also allow us to track spouses and children living at home.  This 
data has various attractions: it covers the population of Danish residents. It does not 
bear any survey component and therefore problems associated with non-response and 
attrition do not arise. The complete data set contains 400,000 adults and tracks them 
for 18 years, making it a total of more than seven million person year observations.  
 
Definition of retirement and eligibility 
 
We identify retirement based on primary attachment to the labour market in the last 
week of November. Both actual retirement and other withdrawals from the labour 
force are considered “retirement”, while employment and unemployment are 
considered “work”. However, it only requires very little work to be classified as in 
                                                          
7 The compilation we use was kindly provided to us by Ministry of Finance’s group DREAM.  
8 The final year is 2004 in “IDA” at the moment. The estimation period, 1980-1996 is chosen so 
minimize the impact of labour market pension. .   
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“work” state for individuals that actually have their main income from pensions.9 We 
therefore impose the extra requirement that wage earnings need be higher than 
pensions in order to be classified as employed/unemployed, otherwise individuals are 
classified as “retired”.  
 
Eligibility to early retirement is not observed in the data and must be computed by 
looking at retrospective membership of UI funds. Note that for many individuals 
eligibility can be decided on membership in UI funds in the 1970’es, which is 
unobserved. We split the sample in three parts. The “eligibles” at age 60, defined as 
belonging to cohort 1925-1930 (1931-1936) and observed membership of an UI fund 
for at least five (ten) years before 60 years of age. The “ineligibles” are defined as 
belonging to cohort 1925 to 1936 who have not been members of an UI fund for at 
least six years after 1980 or for at least six years within last ten (15) years if available 
for cohorts 1925-1930 (1931-1936). The “remaining”, where either eligibility cannot 
be determined or the exact age at which eligibility is gained cannot be determined, is 
not used as timing uncertainty can provide the model poor policy simulation policies.  
 
Figure 1 presents the retirement hazard (transition from “work” to “retirement”) by 
eligibility type. Those eligible (at age 59) for early retirement have very low 
retirement probabilities before age 60. For ineligibles the retirement is much higher 
before age 60. It reflects the fact that to become eligible a very stable employment 
pattern must be observed. It is likely that some of those retiring at age 55 because of 
for example disability would have been eligible if they were not disabled. For the 
same reason we avoid modelling disability and the decision of eligibility before age 
60 by focusing on the 59+ group in the estimations. Furthermore, we remove all 
individuals retired before age 59. After age 60 a large increase in the hazard is seen 
for the eligible. It also quite high for age 61 and especially age 68, which motivates 
our MA(1) error in the retirement equation. For ineligibles there is a slight increase in 
retirement after age 60, perhaps reflecting declining health conditions or easier access 
to disability pension, which can be given for social reason at that age. At the age of 
old age pension (67 years) the retirement pattern looks similar across eligiblity 
groups. 
                                                          
9 In each year individuals can be both working and retired. Then Statistics Denmark classify primary 
attachment work has much higher priority than pension (see Statistics Denmark, 2000). 
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Sample selection 
 
As discussed under the institutional setting above, a large group of individuals is 
covered by public pensions only (and perhaps also by savings on bank personal 
accounts). This is the group we are interested in this paper. The data contains net 
taxable wealth, which includes real estate and portfolios on bank accounts and 
deposits, but does not contain either labour market pensions or private pension 
savings accounts. We do also lack information on whether public employees are 
eligible for civil servants pensions. For this reason we exclude all public employees 
and employees in transport, post and telecommunication, where the latter industries 
are - to a large extent - characterized by government involvement. Self-employed 
individuals for whom it is often quite difficult to obtain income measures and hence to 
compute a reliable social security measure are removed. The final group of agents left 
out of the sample are academics (18+ years of schooling), who are more likely to have 
a labour market pension. The final sample consists of private sector employees 
without academic education. The sample is further restricted to individuals working at 
age 59 and who are observed for at least two periods. The estimation sample consists 
of 15,580 person-year observations10.  
 
Table 1 provides insights into the sources of income for the selected sample. 
Retirement income sources are early retirement benefits (if eligible), disability- and 
old age pensions and “Other income” consists of earnings, capital income, pensions 
(taxable), and ATP11. The median retirement income for the retired under the age of 
67 is ten times larger than median other incomes. For age group at 67 and older it is 
only 1½ times larger. The main reason “other income” is important for 67+ is that the 
benefit level is much lower and ATP and other pension plans are received. 
 
5 Incentive measures 
Coile et al., 2000, suggest using the peak value to incorporate the incentive effects of 
retirement. The peak value is the difference between the maximum present value 
                                                          
10 In addition to the selection mentioned in the text we also remove individuals with very low (<8,000 
(1980 DKK) or very high earnings (> 1,000,000 (1980) DKK) and we require individuals to be in work 
at age 59.  
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social security wealth in the future from continued work and the present value of 
social security wealth today. If the peak value is positive additional years of work will 
generate higher scoial security wealth. The approach is closely related to the option 
value of postponing retirement. In the option value the maximum expected value of 
continued work is compared to today’s social security wealth under a payoff function. 
  
In Appendix A we develop the detailed computation of retirement incentives12. Here 
we just note that individuals take the system as it is and adjust future benefits, with a 
growth factor of one percent (in 1983-1986 the government did not change the 
maximum early retirement benefit and in this case it can be discussed whether the one 
percent increase should be used) for the future. The present value calculation uses a 
real interest rate of three percent and a gender and age specific survival probabilities 
from publicly available life tables. If individuals are part time insured we calculate the 
early retirement benefit as for full time insured but adjust the maximum with 2/3 of a 
full time insured. Old age pension is modelled for couples and singles separately 
because of the tax treatment. Indexation of old age pension is again with a real growth 
rate of one percent. For disability pension we take a very simple approach and assume 
all ineligible to early retirement can draw this pension for social reasons. It is in 
contrast to the literature, where the take up rate is modelled and applied to construct a 
measure of expected social security wealth. When we assume everyone can draw 
disability pension, this induces a downward bias in the incentives of retiring. The 
micro simulation model includes major reforms in early retirement and normal 
retirement system as well as minor year-to-year adjustments, which we have collected 
through annual publication in the area of social insurance (see Forlaget Idag). 
 
The changes in retirement benefit rules are important for identification. Early 
retirement benefits had some major changes in the incentive structure in the 
estimation period and depend on previous earnings, which provide enough variation 
for identification for eligible.13 Less adjustment have taken place for old age pension. 
Since we assume that retirement is absorbing and associated with complete 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 ATP is a small supplementary public regulated labour market pension. 
12 From the social security wealth formula it is also clear how eligibility to early retirement influence 
the social security wealth measure. 
22
  
16
withdrawal from the labour force, old age pensions are not dependent on individual 
earnings. As we include year trend, gender and cohabitation status in the estimation, 
this assumption made it very difficult to identify the incentive effects from old age 
pension per se. Therefore we tried another avenue where we have computed old age 
pensions taking into account labour supply of spouse.14 The old age supplement is 
depending on household income and this provided enough variation to get a better fit 
of old age pension. The computation of social security wealth therefore includes 
spousal income. 
 
In Table 2 the median social security wealth and peak value are shown by age group 
and eligibility to early retirement. For both “eligible” and “ineligible” social security 
wealth is falling with age, which reflects forgone early retirement benefit and 
disability pension and later old age pension. The level is quite different, which reflects 
that early retirement benefit paid at the maximum level is more generous than 
disability pensions. The same can be seen from the peak value. It is negative and 
incentives are stronger in early retirement. Note that the peak value is rising in 
absolute terms up to age 64-65 for “eligible”. Two things can explain this. First, the 
reduction in early retirement benefit after 2½ year and later after five years does not 
take place for those, who postpone retirement. Second, low wage earners retire earlier 
than high wage earners. For “ineligible” the peak value drops in absolute terms. This 
is because singles retire earlier than couples. Singles have a larger tax deduction and 
spousal income reduces old age pensions for couples. Moreover, it can be seen from 
the spread between tenth and 90th percentile that the variation in early retirement and 
disability/old age pension are not that different.  
 
With the micro simulation model we can simulate the social security wealth of those 
ineligible to early retirement assuming they could draw early retirement benefit. This 
potential social security wealth can be used as and control varaible in eligility 
equation and therefore provide an additional exclusion restriction in the econometric 
model. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 It is possible that earnings are correlated with preferences for leisure in that case we will overstate 
retirement incentives. We follow the literature and include as additional controls a polynomial in 
earnings to adjust for this.  
14 We are aware that spouse labour supply is endogenous and should be modelled simultaneously with 
individuals. Here we assume it is exogenous and that spouse work until the age of 71. 
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6 Descriptive statistics 
We look at figures combining retirement and eligibility with some of our exogenous 
explanatory variables. Previous analyses into the determinants of UI fund membership 
is very sparse (Parson et al.,2002). First, voluntary UI funds only exist in a few 
countries, for example also in Sweden and Finland where there are voluntary element 
to UI. By contrast, retirement is described in detail in many studies (for Denmark 
Bingley et al. 2002 is good reference). 
 
 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for variables other than the incentive 
measures across eligibility to early retirement status at age 59. First, 85 per cent of the 
sample is eligible to early retirement benefit, which is slightly more than the 
population. The reason is that we exclude academics and public employees. Second, 
we comment on the time invariant variables or those who changes slowly across time. 
The “eligibles” to “early retirement” constitute a more homogenous group than the 
“ineligibles”. This becomes apparent from comparing the two columns with the 
corresponding standard error. Mean real income (earnings) are approximately the 
same for both groups; but median real income for “ineligible” are 105,870 DKK and 
76,100 for “eligible”. Apart from that, the sample is dominated by males with a 
spouse. Education is low in the sample. Only 6% (2%) have an education of 16 years 
for “ineligbles” (“eligibles”), while 57% have twelve to 14 years of education.  Most 
individuals hold a full time job, in particular the “eligibles”. On one hand the 
“ineligible” are mainly living in the area of Copenhagen and are white collar workers 
and on the other hand the “eligible” are blue collar workers living out side 
Copenhagen. The majority of the sample is owner-occupiers without (taxable) debt. 
Moreover manufacturing and trade and hotels are the most import industry 
affiliations.  
 
Industry and occupation are supposed to pick up union pressure of joining a UI fund, 
which are managed by the unions (Parson et al., 2002). Since industry and occupation 
are indicators of unemployment and health condition, which are known to be good 
predictors of retirement, it is clear that industry and occupation also directly influence 
retirement. 
24
  
18
 
Overall retirement patterns by gender, as shown in Figure 2, are similar to the patterns 
in Figure 1: “eligibles” to early retirement retire much earlier than the “ineligible”. 
Women retire earlier than men. They also tend to have lower earnings, implying that 
their replacement rate is higher.  
 
Figure 3 repeats the general pattern that “eligible” retire earlier than “ineligible”. For 
“eligible” retirement differs little across single and couples. Generally, “ineligible” 
singles retire earlier than couples.  
 
Figure 4 shows that earnings are important for retirement. Individuals are classified as 
low wage earners if their earnings are less than the 1. quartile at age 59 and high wage 
earner if earnings are higher than the 3. quartile. Initially, at age 60, more than 50 per 
cent of the “eligible” with a low wage retires. First, low wage earners have a higher 
replacement rate and therefore higher incentives to retire earlier. Second, earnings are 
possibly correlated with preferences for leisure. The latter means that high wage 
earners have lower preferences for leisure (Coile et al., 2000). 
 
We construct individual health shocks from public provided sickness benefit. This is 
only an indicator of health conditions and for certain employment groups the 
employer might pay full income in the period of sickness.15 The latter problem would 
be pronounced for public employees and academics, which are excluded from the 
analysis. We will expect that sickness benefit might be very differently distributed 
across eligibility. The reason is that disability pension requires a period of screening 
before disability pensions are paid.  On one hand those eligible for early retirement 
can retire immediately in case of poor health and on the other hand those ineligible to 
early retirement benefit will have to go through the screening period. Table 4 shows 
that sickness benefits provide evidence of increasing retirement. Especially, for 
“ineligible” – as expected – receiving sickness benefits increase changes of getting a 
pension.  
 
                                                          
15 If the employer does not pay full income, he/she is typically required to pay two weeks of sickness 
benefit. 
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Table 5 indicates the role of individual labour demand shock. We provide the 
probability of retiring as a function of three types of shocks. The first is plant closure. 
The second, plant expansion is a dummy equal to one if numbers of new employees as 
a percent of ultimo employees in the firm multiplied with number of employees initial 
exceeds 20. This definition balance size of firm and growth rate.  The third, plant 
downsizing is a dummy equal to one ‘if number of employees leaving as a percentage 
of initial number of employees multiplied with initial plant size’ exceeds 20. Again 
correction for plant size put more weights on larger firms. For closing plants and 
downsizing we see the expected rise in retirement rates as compared with other. 
Surprisingly expansion in a firm induces retirement for “ineligible” and only a minor 
change for “eligible”, but this is an artefact of the construction of the variable, which 
is seen as a percentage of ultimo size. If we control for plant downsizing is zero, the 
probabilities changes to 5.7 (18.3) for “ineligible” (“eligible”). The same can be said 
for downsizing if we control for plant expansion is zero. 
 
7 Estimation results 
 
In this section we take a look at the bivariate models result. Three models are 
estimated. First, a model is estimated without serial correlation in retirement equation 
and correlation between eligibility to early retirement and retirement, which is the 
same as eligibility is treated exogenous. This model is the Coile et al., 2000. The 
second model adds correlation between retirement equation and eligibility and a 
random effect. The third model extends model two with an ARMA(1,1) error. All 
three models are estimated with the same covariates. 
  
The three models predict reasonably well the retirement outcome. The coefficients on 
the incentive measures are estimated with the correct sign in all three models and all 
control variables have their expected sign, which can be seen in Table 6. A Wald test 
for exogeneity of eligibility is provided by the square of the t-ratio on the coefficient 
for correlation between eligibility and retirement, ρεζ in the bottom of Table 6. This is 
value is 51.4 (47.6) in model II (III) and we therefore reject exogeneity. It seems as if 
incentive measures are only slightly affected by accounting for unobserved 
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heterogeneity and serial correlation in the error term. However the age terms seem to 
have picked up most of the unobserved heterogenity.  
 
Before we plunge into a detailed discussion of coefficients and incentive effects, we 
shall discuss the model fit. We compare model outcomes with the observed retirement 
pattern. Prediction from model I to III is done by simulation. First, we draw an error 
for the eligibility equation and for the retirement sequence, t = 1,…,Ti for individual i 
jointly.16 Second, for each individual we use the simulated errors to calculate 
retirement age. Third, we do one and two 15 times and average across simulations.  
 
Figures 5a and 5b show the fit of model I to III for “eligible” and “ineligible”, 
respectively, where we use the simulation strategy above. The models predicts 
retirement pattern for the “eligible” reasonably good in Figure 5a. All three models 
are hard to distinguish. In general, retirement is slightly understated in the models. All 
models seem to have troubles at age 67. Figure 5b shows the fit for “ineligible”. The 
three models seem to follow each other quite closely. Model I overstates retirement at 
age 60, and model II and III understates retirement in the mid 60’es.  
 
While coefficients in a probit model are hard to interpret except for their sign, Table 7 
give the effect of a change in social security wealth of DKK 10,000 (1980) on 
retirement, where we have evaluated the probability at mean sample values for other 
control variables. We shall only comment on results from model III as only small 
differences occur across model I - III. The effect of social security wealth, DKK 
10,000 (1980), is an incease of 0.43 percentage point in the retirement hazard. On the 
other hand an incresae in peak value of DKK 10,000 reduces retirement with 7.3 
percentage points a quite large effect. Another way to evaluate this measure is by the 
elasticity of non – participation, i.e. for social security wealth log
log
P
ssw
∂⎡ ⎤∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , which 
are estimated to be 1.30 and 0.54 for social security wealth and peak value 
respectively. These estimates show a quite high response to social security wealth and 
the peakvalue. We have not been able to recover the elasticity of non-participation for 
other Danish studies; but can compare with US. In Coile and Gruber (2000) the 
                                                          
16 For model II and III we use rejection sampling to draw an error structure consistent with individual’s 
eligibility status. 
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elasticities are 0.30 and 0.15 respectively.  The main reason for the very large 
elasticities in our study is that we are analyzing a sample of very old17. To control for 
the effect of age on the elasticities we have computed the elasticity at age 59 (and all 
other controls at their mean values), which changes the elasticities to 0.75 and 0.31 
respectively. 
 
It is hard to think about the effects of social security wealth and peak value separately. 
Therefore, in the next section, we dwell more into the effects of pension incentive by 
simulation of some changes to the social security system.  
 
Age is an important variable as we saw above. It influences the elasticity of non-
participation. Moreover, it also reflects health, which is only included with the proxy 
variable sickness benefits. Accounting for intertemporal linkages can be quite 
important for interpretation of effects. From estimates of the three models in Table 6, 
we can see that age picks up unobserved heterogeneity. In Table 8 the increment in 
the probability of retiring from age t to age t+1 is given. As we can see the probability 
is positive for all age groups and reflects that the probability of retiring increases with 
age. The increase in model II and III is much stronger than in model I. Therefore 
accounting for these linkages can be quite important in simulations with the model.  
 
A few other variables are also affected by the error structure in the model. First, 
health, which is interacted with eligibility, has clearly become more important. For 
“ineligible” health has the correct sign and is highly significant. While for “eligible” 
poor health has an insignificant effect. This of course reflects the option “eligible” has 
of retiring in case of poor health without going through a period on sickness pay. 
Labour market shocks are not affected by the error structure as expected. Perhaps a 
little surprising we find that males are much more likely to retire than females. But we 
condition on individuals are working at age 59. It is therefore difficult to compare this 
with other studies as all females retired before age 60 are excluded from the analysis. 
The remaining controls in the regression show more or less the expected sign. 
 
                                                          
17 The mean age in the Coile et al., 2000, sample is 58.5 compared with our sample with an average age 
of 60.9 years. Comparing coefficients across discrete choice models can be difficult as the marginal 
effects depend on other covariates.  
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These are the key results from our retirement equation. The main results from the 
eligibility to early retirement equation concern the exclusion restrictions. Industry, 
occuaption and potential social security wealth are all highly predictive of eligibility 
(see Table 6, lower panel). The sign of coefficients are all of the expected sign. In 
Table 7 the effect of an 10,000 DKK increase in potential social security wealth is 
associated with a 0.88 percentage points change in probability of being “eligible” and 
translated to an elasticity it is as high as 0.74. The other covariates show the expected 
sign.  
 
For investigating sensitivity of the model to some of our assumptions, we have also 
estimated models, which include industry and occupation in the retirement equation 
and this did not have an effect on the results. Moreover, we have estimated a version, 
which includes lagged unemployment for individuals and spouse retirement status and 
this did not change results either. 
 
8 Policy simulation 
 
In this section we simulate the outcome for the bivariate probit model with random 
effect and serial correlation from two different policy scenarios, model III. The first is 
similar to the reform in Bingley et al. (2002). We change the window of early 
retirement and old age pension by three years. The second policy scenario has to do 
with the 1999 reform of early retirement. The policy simulation looks at both the 
effect on retirement and on eligibility. The usual disclaimer applies that all variables 
and the error term are invariant to the policy simulation. 
 
3 year reform 
 
We have implemented the three year reform by abolishing early retirement and 
disability pensions for age group 60 to 62. Otherwise the benefit and tax rules applies 
as before. Duration of early retirement benefit is seven years and old age pension is 
available from age 70. 
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In Table 9 below the fictive reform increases retirement age by 2.2 years for 
“eligible” and 1.1 years for “ineligible”, the same reform in Bingley et al., 2002, only 
increased retirement by 1.3 years. The big difference can be attributed to an analysis 
of the very old in our paper. The reform shows that there is a potential large effect 
from abolishing early retirement benefit. The effect on “ineligible” will be smaller, as 
they did already retire later in the baseline.  
 
We can access the effect of policy on eligibility status, which is not included in the 
estimates on retirement age. We see that eligibility drops with 7 percentage points due 
to the lower level of social security wealth. This would increase the average 
retirement age further. Note, in the discussion on policy reform it is sometimes argued 
that removing early retirement benefit just shifts the burden to a different retirement 
scheme. This is not possible here as disability pension is also delayed. 
 
1999 reform 
 
The reform in 1999 changed normal retirement from age 67 years to 65 years. 
Moreover, working to age 65 means a tax allowance –always given at age 65 - of 6 
percent of maximum UI benefit for each of 3 months worked after age 62 for 
“eligible”. Moreover the reform introduced an annual contribution, which must be 
paid for at least 25 years to be eligible to early retirement. We have estimated the 
contribution to be DKK 40,000 (1980) and subtracted it from social security wealth. 
Retiring before age 62 the maximum early retirement benefit is 91% of maximum 
unemployment insurance and for individuals retiring after age 62 it is 100% of 
maximum unemployment insurance.18  
 
The results of the simulation are given in Table 8 under policy II. As we can see that 
average retirement age is falling for “eligible” with 0.2 years and status quo for 
“ineligible”.  
 
                                                          
18 The last major element in the reform is a reduction in early retirement benefit for those who retire 
before age 62 and have private pension deposits. Even if the private pension plan is delayed the 
reduction on benefit will take place. We have excluded this.  
 
30
  
24
First, the incentives to postpone retirement to age 62 has increased retirement age; but 
as the calculations show the income effect from early retirement at age 62 is quite 
high and actually induces more to retire at age 62. Moreover the tax allowance also 
has a substitution effect and income effect, which means that retirement at age 63 and 
64 is quite high. 
 
Second, for “ineligible” the status quo is because shifting the retirement age from age 
67 to age 65, does not change the old age pension retirement incentives as we have 
assumed that individuals had access to disability pensions. 
 
However, the largest effect of the 1999 reform we find on “eligibility”. The 
magnitude is almost as removing the early retirement benefit and disability pension 
for three years. This will in the long run rise average retirement age as well. 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
The key findings of the paper can be summarized as: We found that eligibility is 
endogenous. In the policy simulation some of the largest effects come from the 
eligibility equation. Unobserved heterogeneity had minor influence on the incentive 
measures and not as strong effects as in Börsch-Supan, 1999. But unobserved 
heterogeneity changed the importance of some of the other included variables, mainly 
those relating to health, i.e. age and the health proxy. A finding Börsch-Supan also 
did. 
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Appendix A: Incentive measures 
 
We compute the peak value of retiring from the early retirement benefit scheme and 
disability and old age pension. A calculation of early retirement benefits requires the 
knowledge of gross earnings.19 Therefore, we need to estimate earnings to project 
future earnings. This is done in two steps.  
 
In the first step we correct any earnings in a given year for periods of unemployment. 
Correction for unemployment is done in the following way. If we observe less than 6 
months of unemployment, we simply divide earnings with one minus the 
unemployment rate. For individuals with more than six months of unemployment we 
use lagged earnings from a period with less than 6 months of unemployment. Second, 
we project future annual earnings in a very simple way assuming a real growth rate of 
1 percent. Coile et al., 2000, use this assumption. 
 
In calculating social security wealth we use actual rules from the social security 
system and the tax system from 1980 to 1996. This data is collected from the Danish 
tax authorities and a series of publication from “Forlaget Idag”. In very rough terms 
the tax system can be described as a flat local government tax of around 30% with 
minor variation across municipalities and a progressive state tax system with a major 
reform in 1987 and again in 1994. Early retirement benefit depends on previous 
earnings up to a maximum limit. This limit was approximately 84,000 in 1980. The 
median worker has a replacement rate of 0.82 in our sample at age 59. The level of 
old age insurance was 30,000 DKK in 1980. The disability system is modelled as old 
age pension, which is comparable if disability pensions are provided for social 
reasons. Different supplements exist depending on the degree of lost work capacity in 
case of a disability.  
 
We impute the present value of social security wealth by the following formula for an 
individual of age t retiring at age R. Then we have myopic expectations with respect 
to policy changes; the formula changes from year to year based on the social security 
system in a given year. 
                                                          
19 In calculation of disability and old age pensions we use spouse income if a working spouse is 
present. The same projection of earnings is used up to age 71 for the spouse. 
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where we have suppressed dependence on i individual and τ year. T is time at 
certainty of death (age 100). It is discounted by discount rate D and a gender and age 
specific survival probability ρs,t of being alive at age s conditional on survival to age t. 
e denotes eligibility and Erb and Oap are the after tax benefit levels.  
 
For the regression we use as explanatory variables the current social security wealth 
SSWt(R=t) and the peak value: 
 
( )max ( ) ( ),t t tjPeak SSW j SSW t j t= − >  
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
Table 1: Median annual income in retirement, 1980 DKK 
  Retirement 
income Other income   
Age < 67 66,232.3  6,640.1 
Age >=67 29,861.2 17,632.2 
Number of observations: 4702 
Note: Retirement in year t and income in year t+1. 
Source: IDA database 
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Table 2: Incentive measure, social security wealth and peak value, (1980 DKK)
Social security wealth Peak value
Age Ineligible Eligible Ineligible Eligible
59 Median 622543 693462 -12798 -3567
1. decile 502524 625175 -14821 -11085
9. decile 833157 881544 -11159 4645
60 Median 605231 670143 -13376 -24427
1. decile 476873 608945 -19046 -27209
9. decile 791029 849676 -11686 -20629
61 Median 557645 625989 -13254 -24120
1. decile 451301 567436 -18430 -26776
9. decile 750734 795836 -11309 -20592
62 Median 515430 583515 -13109 -24279
1. decile 427382 525901 -19188 -26906
9. decile 839358 742498 -11153 -21575
63 Median 485873 547201 -13014 -24091
1. decile 406308 488487 -17877 -26310
9. decile 674362 693516 -10877 -21447
64 Median 455218 507601 -12709 -27018
1. decile 383884 452332 -16684 -28663
9. decile 604988 654897 -10544 -24218
65 Median 429163 466573 -12599 -30643
1. decile 362568 415334 -16715 -32074
9. decile 583202 722920 -10445 -25757
66 Median 405995 424152 -12058 -29660
1. decile 346246 374867 -15906 -32521
9. decile 571438 590734 -10459 -23220
67 Median 406262 382221 -12187 -11897
1. decile 329728 329728 -15023 -15340
9. decile 539710 539710 -10157 -10216
68 Median 367987 359982 -11649 -11620
1. decile 309927 313711 -15020 -14989
9. decile 491311 509061 -9883 -9903
69 Median 345676 345676 -11215 -11215
1. decile 291023 294713 -14176 -17820
9. decile 479829 584124 -9191 -9585
70 Median 330186 324427 -11170 -10893
1. decile 275750 316558 -17835 -17614
9. decile 548967 548967 -9091 -10436
71 Median 300762 304128 -10245 -10257
1. decile 259169 297395 -16888 -17424
9. decile 515764 528780 -8917 -10232
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics at age 59 by eligiblity status
Ineligible Eligible
Mean std. Err. min max Mean std. Err. min max
Log(income) 11,45 0,03 9,02 13,67 11,50 0,01 9,07 13,46
Male 0,62 0,02 0 1 0,74 0,01 0 1
Single 0,18 0,01 0 1 0,16 0,01 0 1
School: 12-14 years 0,57 0,02 0 1 0,57 0,01 0 1
School: 16 years 0,06 0,01 0 1 0,02 0,00 0 1
Poor Health 0,01 0,00 0 1 0,06 0,00 0 1
Bad Health 0,02 0,01 0 1 0,01 0,00 0 1
Part time job 0,24 0,02 0 1 0,08 0,00 0 1
Living in Copenhagen area 0,50 0,02 0 1 0,35 0,01 0 1
White collar 0,60 0,02 0 1 0,41 0,01 0 1
Year 89,62 0,15 84 96 90,42 0,06 84 96
Neagtive taxable wealth 0,21 0,02 0 1 0,16 0,01 0 1
Homeowner 0,51 0,02 0 1 0,61 0,01 0 1
Downsizing plant 0,81 0,02 0 1 0,81 0,01 0 1
Closure 0,03 0,01 0 1 0,04 0,00 0 1
Expanding plant 0,80 0,02 0 1 0,79 0,01 0 1
Potential experience 0,74 0,01 0 1 0,81 0,00 0,04 1
Unemployment degree 0,00 0,00 -0,13 0,12 0,00 0,00 -0,12 0,31
Manufacturing 0,30 0,02 0 1 0,51 0,01 0 1
Utilities 0,03 0,01 0 1 0,02 0,00 0 1
Construction 0,07 0,01 0 1 0,11 0,01 0 1
Trade and Hotel 0,28 0,02 0 1 0,23 0,01 0 1
Financial intermediation 0,25 0,02 0 1 0,10 0,00 0 1
Private services 0,01 0,00 0 1 0,01 0,00 0 1
Proportion retiring 0,45 0,75
Mean retirement age 62,74 0,14 60 71 61,53 0,04 60 71
Number of observations 669 3817
 
Table 4: Health and retirement probability
Ineligible Eligible
No sickness benefit 0,08 0,23
Sickness benefit < 20,000 DKK 0,32 0,23
Sickness benefit > 20,000 DKK 0,64 0,32
Source: IDA database and own calculations
 
Table 5: Labour market shocks and retirement probability
Ineligible Eligible
Plant closes 0,27 0,35
Plant expansion 0,15 0,33
Plant downsizing 0,16 0,34
Other 0,10 0,30
Source: IDA database and own calculations
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Table 6: Results from bivariate probit model
Retirement equation Model III
Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat
Peak value -5,91 -25,65 -5,70 -23,27 -5,67 -22,60
SSW 2,42 7,27 2,16 5,68 2,28 5,55
Age -0,02 -0,05 1,68 3,64 2,07 3,05
Age2 2,50 5,92 1,65 3,53 1,25 1,74
Log income -0,51 -13,81 -0,54 -12,35 -0,54 -12,16
Male 0,65 9,09 0,62 7,31 0,64 7,01
Single -0,31 -4,91 -0,23 -3,10 -0,25 -3,18
12 to 14 years of education -0,02 -0,53 -0,04 -1,08 -0,04 -1,06
16 years of education -0,16 -1,84 -0,26 -2,43 -0,28 -2,50
0 < sickness benefit < 20,000 0,51 3,06 0,71 3,93 0,71 3,86
sickness benefit > 20,000 1,45 7,32 1,65 7,91 1,65 7,89
(0 < sickness benefit < 20,000)*eligibility -0,45 -2,47 -0,73 -3,74 -0,73 -3,66
(sickness benefit > 20,000)*eligibility -1,17 -4,81 -1,53 -5,99 -1,53 -5,94
Part time job -0,21 -3,90 -0,23 -3,80 -0,23 -3,73
Living in area of Copenhagen -0,10 -3,41 -0,16 -4,52 -0,17 -4,52
Year -0,11 -1,64 -0,05 -0,68 -0,05 -0,67
Negative wealth -0,20 -4,56 -0,24 -4,76 -0,24 -4,74
Home owner -0,08 -2,65 -0,11 -2,84 -0,11 -2,85
Firm contraction 0,25 4,53 0,27 4,53 0,27 4,48
Firm close 0,38 5,79 0,39 5,76 0,39 5,68
Firm expansion -0,37 -6,91 -0,39 -7,03 -0,40 -7,02
Experience -0,63 -8,17 -0,88 -8,46 -0,90 -7,78
Unemployment by industry 0,96 1,72 0,79 1,30 0,75 1,21
Constant 2,73 6,55 3,39 7,10 3,29 6,65
Number of observations 15.580 15.580 15.580
Model I Model II
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Table 6 (continued)
Eligibility equation Model I Model II Model III
Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat
SSW 4,68 7,29 4,62 7,23 4,60 7,20
log(income) -0,43 -5,40 -0,41 -5,15 -0,41 -5,14
Male 0,88 5,64 0,92 5,90 0,92 5,88
Single -0,84 -6,79 -0,82 -6,65 -0,82 -6,63
12 to 14 years of education -0,09 -1,60 -0,10 -1,70 -0,10 -1,70
years of education -0,47 -3,57 -0,47 -3,58 -0,47 -3,58
0 < sickness benefit <= 20,000 0,41 2,60 0,30 1,92 0,30 1,92
sickness benefit > 20,000 -0,55 -3,58 -0,83 -4,02 -0,83 -4,02
Part time job -0,60 -6,02 -0,60 -6,04 -0,60 -6,05
Living in area of Copenhagen -0,21 -3,93 -0,22 -4,17 -0,22 -4,19
Manufacturing 1,06 7,92 0,92 6,84 0,92 6,82
Utilities 0,58 3,02 0,49 2,60 0,49 2,58
Construction 0,96 6,42 0,84 5,57 0,83 5,54
Trade and hotels 0,90 6,55 0,80 5,84 0,80 5,82
Financial intermediation 0,50 3,47 0,38 2,63 0,38 2,63
Private services 0,82 2,96 0,69 2,51 0,70 2,52
White collar -0,23 -3,89 -0,24 -4,10 -0,24 -4,10
Year 0,50 4,67 0,49 4,62 0,49 4,63
Negative wealth -0,17 -2,57 -0,18 -2,67 -0,18 -2,67
Unemployment by industry 0,40 0,38 0,61 0,59 0,61 0,59
Home owner 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,23 -0,01 -0,23
Firm contraction 0,03 0,33 0,01 0,08 0,01 0,07
Firm close 0,22 1,51 0,18 1,24 0,18 1,25
Firm expansion -0,16 -1,55 -0,13 -1,30 -0,13 -1,38
Experience 0,42 3,05 0,23 1,61 0,23 1,60
Constant 1,24 1,64 1,33 1,76 1,34 1,77
Number of observations 4.486 4.486 4.486
Loglikelihood -10.007 -9.952 -9.932
Covariance parameters
συ 0,33 6,19 0,11 0,61
ρεζ 0,24 7,17 0,24 6,90
ρ 0,61 4,52
θ -0,38 -3,88
Note: Model I: covariance matrix is identity matrix, 
Model II: a random effect and correlation of error in eligibility and retirement equation
Model III: random effect, correlation of error in eligibility and retirement equation and ARMA(1,1) in retirement equation
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Table 7: Incentive effects
Retirement equation Model I Model II Model III
Peak value Dkk 10,000 6,81% 7,31% 7,27%
Elasticity 0,52 0,54 0,54
Social security wealth Dkk 10,000 0,43% 0,41% 0,43%
Elasticity 1,28 1,23 1,30
Eligibility equation
Potential social 
security wealth Dkk 10,000 0,90% 0,88% 0,88%
Elasticity 0,75 0,74 0,74
Table 8: Age effects
Model I Model II Model III
60 0 0,02 0,02
61 0,01 0,03 0,03
62 0,01 0,04 0,05
63 0,02 0,06 0,06
64 0,03 0,08 0,08
65 0,05 0,10 0,10
66 0,07 0,11 0,11
67 0,09 0,12 0,12
68 0,12 0,12 0,11
69 0,13 0,10 0,10
70 0,13 0,08 0,07
71 0,11 0,05 0,05
 
 
Table 9: Policy scenarios
Average retirement age
Eligible Ineligible
Actual 61,1 63,6
Baseline 61,1 63,9
Policy I 63,3 65,0
Policy II 60,9 63,9
Proportion eligible
Actual 0,85
Baseline 0,86
Policy I 0,79
Policy II 0,80
Note: Average retirement age is simulated
conditional on eligibilty
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Appendix C: Figures 
Figure 1: Retirement hazard by eligibility 
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Figure 2: Retirement and gender 
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Figure 3: Retirement and Single status 
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Figure 4: Retirement and wages 
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The Interaction of Long-term Unemployment and Retirement 
Martin Junge1 
Centre for Economic and Business Research, Copenhagen Business School 
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1. Version 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper we model and estimate a discrete choice model of retirement and 
long-term unemployment with a sample of older workers in Denmark. Unemployment is 
a common pre-retirement state and around 25 per cent of transitions to retirement at age 
60 are from (long-term) unemployment. Despite the large amount of unemployment prior 
to retirement it is surprising that unemployment is not more widespread as the 
unemployment insurance scheme is more generous than the early retirement scheme. We 
argue here that only if the unemployed are imposed large search cost we can explain this 
fact. The results of the paper points at very large search cost for the unemployed, though 
search also reduces cost of getting a new job. Simulation with the model shows that 
unemployment related retirement schemes can be extremely popular even at low 
economic incentives. Moreover, we compute individual’s willingness to pay for an 
unemployment scheme without search cost. For the unemployed, we find, they are 
willing to live close to subsistence level. 
 
Keywords: Unemployment, retirement, social insurance, dynamic programming, 
incomplete control.  
                                                 
1 The Author would like to thank Martin Browning, Ulrich Kaiser, Hans Christian Kongsted and Nikolaj 
Malchow-Møller for valuable comments. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we are modeling and estimating the joint process of exiting from the labour 
market through unemployment and retirement. The model is a dynamic discrete choice 
model with imperfect control. It is estimated using maximum likelihood on a sample of 
workers, whose main retirement income is public provided support. Individuals maximize 
remaining lifetime utility. In each period, they control their labour market state by 
choosing between unemployment, retirement or full time work. The control is imperfect 
in the sense that the decision to stay in a given job can be overruled by a layoff, which is 
modeled as a function of creative destruction in plants. Utility is derived from income 
and leisure and includes taste shifters. The value of leisure varies across unemployment 
and retirement due to the absence of search requirements in retirement. The model 
incorporates the social insurance system in detail, which induces dynamic incentives, 
e.g., duration dependent benefits and an interaction between the unemployment benefit 
level and early retirement benefits. Moreover wages depend on the history of labour 
supply, general human capital (experience) and firm specific human capital (tenure). 
 
A state variable – unobserved to econometrician – enters the model, which allows us to 
derive conditional choice probabilities. A layer of complication exists, as we have to 
integrate out the unobserved layoff outcome in the likelihood function. This leads to a 
mixing distribution for those who separate from their job. Either they were quitting or 
were laid off. Estimates of parameters are within plausible range of other studies; though 
they appear to be somewhat imprecisely estimated. Policy simulation reveals that early 
retirement distorts incentives heavily. 
 
Public support for early retirement is widespread in many countries. It takes the form of 
either disability pensions, unemployment related pensions or, in some countries, specific 
early retirement schemes. These schemes were quite common from 1980’s to the 1990’s 
(see Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1999). As the pool of unemployed has started to decrease and 
projections of the dependency ratio well into the 21st century shows a decline, many 
governments have started to role back these schemes (Zaidi, 2006). The focus of this 
paper is on the interaction between unemployment and retirement and the incentives 
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created from public support. This is highly relevant for unemployment related pension 
schemes. As many early retirement schemes are made less generous, the future role of 
unemployment insurance as an alternative exit route from the labour market can become 
much more important than we see today.  
 
Denmark is no exception in this history of Europe. Three points illustrate this. First, a 
generous early retirement scheme from age 60 (“efterløn”) was introduced in 1979. The 
scheme was intended for workers with a life-long service in the labour market. Eligibility 
was gained through long-term membership of an unemployment insurance fund2,3. 
Though the benefits in this scheme are less generous than unemployment insurance 
benefits, it was right from the start extremely popular. Figure 1 presents the transition 
from work to retirement and from work to unemployment for private sector employees, 
who are eligible for early retirement benefits and who have not retired on disability 
pensions, (aged 50 to 55 in 1980, and with low tenure). Up to age 60 modest 
unemployment transitions exist. At age 58 and 59 somewhat larger transitions occur up to 
5 per cent. Retirement is almost non-existing before age 60. At age 60 early retirements 
benefit can be drawn which can be seen by the dramatic increase in the retirement rate. 
 
Second, in 1992 a very early retirement programme was introduced for long-term 
unemployed (“overgangsydelsen”). It was introduced for the age group 55 – 59 years and 
later extended to the age group 50 to 59 years. It quickly became very popular, and in 
1996 the government abolished the programme as it became too expensive and because 
the Danish economy was experiencing a boom. The model in this paper will be useful for 
measuring the incentive effects of this type of unemployment related pension 
programmes.  
 
Finally, today the government is making it less generous to exit through early retirement 
in order to reduce the inflow. A reform in 1999 thus made it more expensive to join the 
                                                 
2 UI funds are private in Denmark and membership is voluntary. It is organized in trades. A fund exists for 
all private sector workers. 
3 Membership was required five years of the previous ten years to be eligible in 1980. This has been 
strengthen many times since then and today 25 years of membership out of the previous 30 years is 
required. 
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early retirement scheme and introduced tax related subsidies for individuals postponing 
retirement. Moreover, today the government has secured support for a new reform 
making early retirement even less generous. 
 
The model in this paper will try to predict the observed pattern in Figure 1 with a 
structural model of (long-term) unemployment and retirement. The problem is that 
unemployment insurance is more generous than early retirement benefit. And from 
Figure 1 it is clear that early retirement benefits are having much more distorting effects 
on retirement behaviour than UI benefits. Explanations for the spike at age 60 like 
mandatory retirement age, health related explanations and alternative income source (i.e. 
private pension plans) are unlikely to be important here. Mandatory retirement is 
‘officially’ not very common in Denmark for these workers. Moreover, the sample 
consists of low tenure workers, who are not likely to have special retirement contracts 
with their employer. Health is likely to change gradually over time and not as abrupt as in 
Figure 1.  
 
Instead, we argue that a model with differences in the valuation of leisure could be the 
explanation. Leisure will be influenced by job search requirements or whether sanctions 
and activation in the UI system are effective. 
 
 
The previous literature on retirement has made it clear that unemployment is an important 
pre-retirement state. The literature describing the transitions to retirement thus finds 
unemployment to retirement transitions accounts for as much as 40 percent of transitions 
into retirements in Japan (Oishi et al., 2005) and more than 20 percent in Germany and 
France (Börsch-Supan etal., 2005 and Mahieu et al., 2005). These studies rely on income 
definitions to define the unemployment and retirement states. For comparison 25 percent 
of those retiring at age 60 were long-term unemployed, who would probably be classified 
as unemployed by income, in our estimation sample.  
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Structural models that account for both unemployment and retirement decisions are very 
rare in the literature. We are aware of one structural retirement model where 
unemployment and the incentives of UI benefit are modeled (Heyma, 2004) jointly with 
other exit routes from the labour market. But the model treats unemployment as an 
absorbing state and some of the issues like search cost and loss of human capital cannot 
be studied. The focus in his paper is not on unemployment as a pre-retirement state but as 
a retirement state, which is very different from what we do. In the mainly US dominated 
structural retirement literature long-term unemployment is a non-work state and 
equivalent to retirement. Some examples are Rust at al., 1997, who define retirement as 
unemployment/out of labour force. They consider applying for social security and 
Medicare, but not UI benefit. In Van der Klaauw et al., 2006, no unemployment exists. 
Unemployment hides in no-work state and part time work. Berkovec et al., 1991, convert 
short unemployment states where individuals return to previous employer to work and 
long-term unemployment are considered as retirement. French et al., 2004, model work 
as more than 300 hours a year and long-term unemployed gets classified as retired.  
 
The focus of these papers has been on retirement and not unemployment. However, we 
have been convinced by this work that health, wealth and labor market opportunities are 
important for retirement. Moreover social security, private pension plans and Medicare 
(US related literature) are also extremely important predictors of retirement.  
 
Another difference between the present paper and the existing literature is that the 
structural retirement models focus on the case of complete control. Exogenous shocks 
from e.g. labor demand are not modeled. Again, Heyma, 2004, makes an exception. He 
allows for involuntary quits by modeling layoff probabilities. Individuals in his model 
take the layoff probability into account when they decide on their optimal retirement path 
and can involuntarily retire if they are laid off. In Heyma layoffs are observed from a 
questionnaire, if individuals are subsequently unemployed or retired. We model this 
incomplete control case quite differently. In this paper we model layoffs under the 
perhaps more common case that it is only partially observed. Moreover, individuals can 
choose to continue in a new job in this paper. 
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Another literature relevant for this paper is that of search models. Note our model 
contains a search element as individuals can change job and be laid off. The description 
of search for work either from unemployment, work or somewhere else has received a 
very thorough treatment in the literature. On the other hand retirement receives relatively 
little attention, mainly assuming that retirement takes place in a distant future (Eckstein et 
al., 2006). In their survey Eckstein et al. point at Berkovec et al., 1991, as a search model 
including retirement and social security. As already discussed this model does not include 
unemployment but allows for transition between fulltime work, part time work and 
retirement (non-employment). 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by considering unemployment and retirement 
decision jointly. We incorporate some of the search elements into a standard structural 
retirement model. First, job changes are allowed. A job change can either be a layoff or it 
can be voluntary. As job changes are associated with a loss of firm specific human 
capital, which leads to a drop in wages, individuals will change job because of non-
pecuniary shocks to their existing job or the new job offer. Second, unemployment will 
be chosen either voluntarily or involuntarily in case of a layoff. Third, job offers are 
given every period; but there is a cost of leaving unemployment, current job or 
retirement, which can interpreted as the quality of job offers. Fourth, retirement and 
unemployment benefit, duration and eligibility rules are modeled in detail and provide 
dynamic incentives, which are influencing choices. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: First Section 2 updates the reader on the institutional 
setting in Denmark from 1980-1996, which is our sample period. In Section 3, we 
formulate a dynamic discrete choice model of retirement and unemployment. The 
econometric specification and estimation is outlined in Section 4. Section 5 describes the 
Danish administrative data set that we use. Results and measures of fit are provided in 
Section 6. And finally before we conclude in Section 8, we use the estimated model for 
two experiments in Section 7.  
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2. Institutional setting 
 
We have already touched on the Danish system in the introduction. This section gives 
further details. The discussion relates to cohorts born in 1925 to 1930.  
 
We first take up public support for old-age-pension and early retirement. Old-age-pension 
is provided universally and is only based on long-term residence in Denmark. Benefits 
can be drawn from age 67 for individuals born 1925-30 and consist of two tiers: a base 
level tested against labor market income and a supplement tested against household 
income.   
 
Early retirement was introduced in 19794 for workers with a long service life. Eligibility 
is obtained through long-term membership of UI funds, which is voluntary in Denmark. 
Initial requirements, which are the rules applying to our sample, required five years 
membership out of the previous ten years. This requirement has been strengthened 
several times since then. Individuals should also be eligible for UI benefit at the time of 
retirement (see below). The benefit level is 90 percent of the previous wage up to a 
maximum. After 2½ years on maximum benefits the level is reduced to 80 percent and 
after another period of 2½ years to 70%. Re-entry to early retirement after exit was not 
possible. This was changed in 1993 where individuals could leave for work once and then 
come back. Moreover, 200 hours of work per year were allowed without reduction in 
benefits. Benefits do not depend on other income sources in the household. 
 
UI benefits are available for members of UI fund. 6 months of work within the previous 
36 months was necessary to be eligible to UI benefits. The benefit level is 90 percent of 
previous wages up to a maximum.  
 
Unemployed are supposed to be available for work. In many aspects the unemployment 
state reminds of the work state. They have to document they are searching actively for a 
job. They have to note the job centre if they take vacation, which is of the same length as 
                                                 
4 Before 1979 alternative retirement routes existed, including widow pension and disability pension.  
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workers. Job offers have to be accepted otherwise they can be drawn in their benefits. It 
is important to emphasize that these are imposed on older workers, which is often not the 
case in other countries. Though anecdotal evidence points at some loose administration of 
rules in the estimation period because of high unemployment rates. 
 
Active labor market policy was mainly concentrated on maintaining another UI period for 
individuals. Thus a job offer was given before individuals exhausted their UI benefits 
(see The Economic Council (“Det Økonomiske Råd”), 2005). 
 
3. Model 
 
The model is cast in the standard consumption-leisure framework. The model represents 
the decision of an individual and maximizes expected remaining lifetime utility from 
middle age over consumption and leisure bundles. While this framework is very general 
we need to specify a utility function, a state space and uncertainty. We discuss the 
properties of our specification and transform the problem of the individual into a form 
that can be solved by backward recursion inside a likelihood function. We return to the 
latter aspect in the next section. 
 
The standard consumption-leisure framework 
 
The standard framework assumes that individuals maximize lifetime utility, which is 
obtained from consumption and leisure in each period, given initial endowments. We 
assume that utility is additively separable over time and that individuals discount the 
future. The model focuses on older workers, initially of age 50-55, and the problem of 
maximizing remaining lifetime utility conditional on history. Mainly due to data 
limitations we focus on the case where consumption equals income5 or, alternatively, 
                                                 
5 The data contain taxable wealth, which account for the main wealth holdings of individuals. Saving can 
be backed out from changes in wealth, and a correction to disposable income, which needs to be computed 
from taxable income, would then give us consumption. However, computing disposable income from 
taxable income requires much more information than is available in our data. See Browning et al. (2003) 
for a successful attempt and some of the associated problems, where they use a much more comprehensive 
data set on taxable income components than ours. Rust et al. (1997) rationalize the consumption-equal-
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where utility is derived from income. Moreover, only discrete decisions can be taken with 
respect to labor supply. Individuals can work full time, be (long-term) unemployed or 
retire.  
 
So we are looking for a sequence of discrete labor supply choices to maximize remaining 
lifetime utility. The value function V, which is total utility at the optimal sequence of 
discrete choices, can be written: 
 
 (1) { } *
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. . ( , )
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a a a t t t t t a
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where a is initial age, ut is instantaneous utility, ht is the discrete decision of choosing 
unemployment, retirement, or full time work. T is age 100 and T* is age 74, the last 
period where labour market decisions take place. The decision set varies with age. From 
age 50 to 66 all three states can be chosen. And since no unemployment program is 
available after age 66, the choice stands between retirement and full time work. 
Individuals can get laid off in the beginning of a period, and hence labor supply is an 
incomplete control variable. After a layoff, individuals can choose between a new full 
time job, unemployment or retirement. y is income derived from their choice, x contains 
state variables, influencing utility and uncertainty. The state variables are discussed 
below but include: Tenure in current job, labor market experience, gender, single status, 
age, year6, a risk of being fired in the current job, length of current unemployment spell, 
length of current early retirement spell, eligibility criteria for early retirement, and an 
unobserved state variable, which is known to the individual in the current period and 
unknown in future periods. Individuals maximize expected utility, where they have to 
account for the uncertain events of death or - if working - getting fired. Expectations at 
                                                                                                                                                 
income assumption by focusing on low income individuals and using an argument of incomplete markets. 
In Deaton, 1991, individuals with non-stationary income processes and liquidity constraint find it optimal 
to set consumption equal to income. 
6 Year is taken into account here because it represents the parameters of the tax and social insurance system 
in the given year. Individuals are assumed to be myopic with respect to these parameters, and they therefore 
think current policy parameters are unchanged in the future. 
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age a are conditional on initial state xa. The state variables evolve according to a function 
f, the transition equation, which is specified below. 
 
We can write the problem in a recursive form where we explicitly solve for death and 
layoff uncertainty. Let ( , )t t tx x m=  where mt is tenure and tx  contains the remaining 
state variables. 
 
(2) 
{ }
{ }
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1| 1 1 1
1
1| 1 1
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+ + + +
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+ + +
= +
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+ = +⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪− ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
∑
∑
 
 
where β is the discount factor, which is positive and less than 1. ηa+1|a is the survival rate 
to age a+1 conditional on survival to age a. π is the probability of getting fired, which is a 
function of creative destruction at the workplace for the individual if he/she is working or 
the potential workplace if they are not working. Below we discuss the precise details of 
these functions. In case of a death (1-ηa+1|a) future utility become zero. The maximization 
problem is broken down into two parts: First, the solution to the next period problem and 
second, maximization of current utility taking into account the effect on future utility. 
The layoff probability, π, resets the tenure state variable to zero. Note that we have 
explicitly written the expectation operator as of age a. It is easy to see from (1) and (2) 
that we can replace the second and third maximization operator with a value function as 
of age a+1, and write the model in the dynamic programming form: 
 
(3) 
[ ] [ ]{ }1| 1 1 1 1| 1 1( ) max ( ( ), , ) ( , ) ( , 0) (1 ( , )) ( )
a
a a a a a a a a a t a a a a a a a t a ah
V x u y h h x x h E V x m x h E V xβη π βη π+ + + + + + += + = + −
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This is a system of equations, one for each age from a to T. This can be solved by 
backwards recursion subject to the transition equations. In period T no choice takes so the 
value function is simply 
 
 (3a) ( ) ( , )T T TV X U X h R= =  
 
where R denotes the retirement state. The solution at age t between T*+1 and T is, 
 
 
 (3b) [ ]1| 1( ) ( , ) ( )t t t t t t tV X U X h R E V Xβη + += = +  
though there is no observable behavior in these equations, the utility at earlier life stages 
will vary with the old-age-pension system as discussed below and gender specific 
survival rates, which are present in the above equations. 
 
Before age T*+1 individuals have to decide on their labor supply. Therefore the value 
function at this age is specified as,  
 
 (3c) 
[ ] [ ]{ }1| 1 1 1 1| 1 1( ) max ( ( ), , ) ( , ) ( , 0) (1 ( , )) ( )
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t th
V x u y h h x x h E V x m x h E V xβη π βη π+ + + + + + += + = + −
 
 
Empirical implementation 
 
Empirical implementation requires specification of functional forms for u, π and f to be 
able to solve the dynamic programming problem7. Moreover, implementation requires 
that we can identify individuals with a state in the state space. Therefore we have to 
estimate missing state variables, i.e. potential wages for non-workers or single status at 
age 95. First we discuss the functional form of u, f, and π and then estimation of the state 
                                                 
7 Recently semi- and nonparametric dynamic discrete choice models have occurred. See Heckman et al., 
2005 for a semiparametric model and Aguirregabiria, 2005 for a nonparametric model. Magnac et al., 2002 
also discuss the possibility of relaxing parametric specification of some of the functions. 
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space. Finally, empirical implementation requires a functional form for the unobserved 
state variable, which is last topic of this section. 
 
The instantaneous utility function is given by, 
 
(4)
,( )
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, , , , ,
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The first term says that utility is increasing and concave in income. The marginal utility 
of consumption (income) is a complement (υ <0) for or a substitute (υ > 0) for leisure. 
 
The second term reflects valuation of leisure, which is strictly positive. Xt is a vector of 
variables, which shifts the valuation of leisure, including a constant. The variables are 
dummies for sex, for being single and for the interaction of female and being single. As 
these variables do not vary across choices they are only identified relative to full time 
work. But we let the value of leisure differ across unemployment and retirement. We 
think of these differences as the search cost imposed on unemployed. During 
unemployment search efforts, meetings at job centers, acceptance of job offers 
(sometimes in a different occupation) and other requirements are necessary to retain UI 
benefits.  
 
The taste shifters, sex and single, are catching observed heterogeneity. Across the sexes, 
the valuation of leisure can differ because of difference in non-market production. And 
even within sexes valuations could differ across individuals with different marital status. 
 
The third term, age enters exponentially and reflects omitted health variables. While for 
the working population we do have an indirect measure of health, in the form of sickness 
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benefits, we lack the information for unemployed and retired. As with wages we could try 
to predict health for these, but from a previous study (Junge, 2007), this health proxy is 
insignificant in a reduced form retirement equation in a sample very similar to the 
current.  
 
The age term is quite important in our specification. The reason is that early retirement is 
only available from age 60 to 66 and we need to remove changes in health as a function 
of age to able to identify the differences in valuation of the unemployment and early 
retirement states. 
 
In the fourth term, state dependence is introduced as a cost of moving from either 
retirement or unemployment or work to a new job, where we have introduced the 
notation R for retirement, U for unemployment, W for work and N for a new full time 
job. This ‘transitory’ utility cost can be interpreted e.g. as the difficulty of obtaining an 
acceptable wage offer, which is not explicitly modeled. Since we expect that cost of 
leaving unemployment is much lower than retirement, these are the positive side of 
search cost. 
 
Finally, part of the state variables are unobserved, which is reflected in the fifth term. We 
assume that individuals observe this preference shock in the current period but do not 
themselves have information about future shocks.  
 
Transition equations 
 
The transition equations, f, are functions of historical labor force participation. 
Experience, e, on the labor market is given by, 
 
 (5) 1 ( )t t te e I h W+ = + =  
i.e. experience is incremented by 1 if the individual is working in the current period.  
 
Tenure, m, is almost as simple, 
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 (6) ( )1 1( )) (t t t t tm m I h W I j j+ −= + = =  
 
Here tenure is incremented by 1 if the individual works an additional year in the same 
plant (jt=jt-1). From the Mincer type wage equation discussed below, we can predict 
potential wages with information on e and m. 
 
We also keep track of duration of unemployment. 
 
 (7) 1 min(4, ( )) ( ) 4 ( )t t t t tDu Du I h U I h U I h R+ = + = = + =  
 
If Dut takes the value 4 individuals have exhausted their UI benefits and must live on a 
subsistence level discussed below. Note that it is not possible to go from retirement to 
obtaining UI benefits, that is, we let Dut equal 4 in this case. In the same way we keep 
track of number of years in early retirement, 
 
 (8) 1 min(7, ( ) ( )) ( 1) 8 ( 0)t t t t t t tDr Dr I h R Du I h U I el I el+ = + = + = = + =  
 
Where elt is an indicator for eligibility. If Drt+1 take the value 8 then individuals are no 
longer eligible.  Suppose individuals enter retirement from unemployment. Then the 
period with high benefit is reduced accordingly, which is why Dut enters the equation. 
The eligibility condition is, 
 
 (9) 1 1( , ) ( 1)( ( , ) ( 4)), 1t t t t t t t ael el I h r h r I el I h w u I Du el+ −= = = + = = − = =  
 
The first term on the right hand side says that eligibility status do not change as long they 
stay retired. For example if individuals leave early retirement this term turns to zero. The 
second terms says that if individuals are currently working or unemployed and did not 
exhaust their UI benefits, he/she retains eligibility if they were eligible. Finally, initially 
all individuals are eligible through sample selection. 
 
58
 15
The remaining state variables, age and year, are straightforward. Below we discuss being 
single and creative destruction (the risk of being fired) at ‘potential’ workplaces. 
 
Layoffs 
 
We assume that before decisions on labor force participation take place there is a 
probability of getting fired, which is a function of the change in employment within the 
plant where the individual is employed. We do not observe layoffs. Instead it is assumed 
- to help identification - that when a plant shuts down we observe a layoff and we also 
assume that individuals cannot be laid off from a startup. Layoff probabilities in between 
are modeled as a function of the following index describing firm job creation and 
destruction, 
 
(10) 1
1
2 t tt
t t
n nDHS
n n
+
+
−= +  
 
Where DHSt stands for Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuhs index (Davis et al., 1996), and n 
is the number of employees in the firm. The index is the change in employment divided 
by average employment over two periods. Note that for a firm closing it equals -2 and for 
a startup it equals 2. Let π denote the layoff probability, which equals 1 if a plant closes 
and 0 if a plant opens. In between we let the layoff probability be given by the following 
function, 
 
(11) 
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1 2
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t
t t
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θ θπ θ θθ θ
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where DHSt equals -2, πt is one and when DHSt equal to 2, πt is zero. The 
parameterization can be seen as modeling the layoff probability as a beta distribution 
with support [-2, 2] and where θ1(1+½DHSt) and θ2(1-½DHSt) are the parameters. The 
inequality constraint in (?) assumes that the layoff probability for plants with status quo 
59
 16
in the number of employees (DHSt = 0) is smaller than 1-k. Where k is estimated as the 
proportion of older workers (age 51 to 59), which stay in a plant with DHSt = 0 
( kˆ =0.963).  
 
Individuals currently in work are assumed to know the number of employees in the plant 
in the next period and can then back out their layoff probability. This assumption can at 
least on some grounds be justified by the fact that mass layoffs must be reported in 
advance. For future periods they expect that no changes will occur within the plant.8 
 
Estimates of missing state variables 
 
After the specification of functional forms we will discuss how we obtain values of the 
relevant variables for the entire state space. First, we need a projection of the future tax 
and pension system. In a given year we assume that individuals have myopic expectations 
and take the current system as given for all future periods. This is a standard assumption 
in many papers and makes it relatively easy to obtain tax and benefit values for years 
beyond the sample.  
 
Experience, tenure and the duration and eligibility state variables are all controlled 
processes and we do not need to calculate future values for these as they will depend on 
the history of employment decisions. But we obtain real wages for individuals by a 
Mincer type wage equation, where human capital, plant specific capital and ability enter. 
We use this very simple specification from the literature because it does not introduce 
additional state variables. Specifically, we model the log real wage rate as a function of 
tenure, experience and experience squared. The log real wage can then be predicted for 
each individual through their employment history. In addition to the human capital 
variables, tenure and experience, agents are assumed to be endowed with a given ability, 
which we describe by a fixed effect. The results are given in Table 1. The regression is 
based on a sample of older workers (50+) which change plant in the first year we observe 
                                                 
8 Expectations on future layoff probabilities could also be estimated by introducing a parameter, which 
estimates DHS for future periods. Alternatively, agents could use plant size and age to predict job turnover 
in plants. But a regression of DHS on these did only produce very weak correlations. 
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them. This avoids problems with left censoring of tenure (prior to 1980 we have no 
knowledge of tenure). Therefore all individuals have initially no tenure in the estimation 
sample. Experience is measured from 1964 through a measure of contribution to a public 
related pension program, where contributions are based on annual hours worked. We also 
include a dummy for years after 1992 because of a break in the data series for wages. The 
effect of experience is found to very small whereas tenure is quite important. As an 
example: Let us assume an individual receives DKK 60 per hour of work with initial 
experience of 16 years. After 10 years of tenure (+experience) the wage has increased to 
DKK 71 per hour. After a job change the hourly pay will be DKK 61 per hour a drop 
around 14.0 percentage point. Changing or loosing a job is therefore associated with a 
large drop in annual income. 
 
We also need a prediction of creative destruction inside plants. For individuals employed 
we use the observed index for the current period and for others and for out of sample 
predictions, we assume DHS = 0. Individuals in employment at a specific plant therefore 
know the number of employees in the next period, which is not a bad approximation 
given the rules with advantage notice in case of a mass layoff. In all other situations 
individuals assume the firm will have no growth in employment. 
 
 The final state variables are “being single” and “mortality”. We apply the observed 
values from the sample, and for future periods we use the last observed value. One 
possibility would be to use the age-gender specific survival rates and apply these to the 
spouse. For mortality we use age-gender specific survival rates, which are obtained from 
public available life tables (www.statistikbanken.dk). 
 
The unobserved state variable 
 
We assume that the unobserved state variables, the fifth term in (4), are iid extreme value 
type I distributed. This has two implications: First we can solve for the future expected 
utility in the value functions (3). Second, the conditional choice probabilities have closed 
form solutions, which we return to below. This assumption is frequently invoked in 
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dynamic programming models (Rust, 1994, Rust et al., 1997, Heyma, 2004). Let us 
introduce the choice specific value function ( )jt tV X , j = R, U, N, W. We can then write 
the expected value of future utility in closed form,  
 
 (12) ( ){ }1 1 1, , , , , ,max ( ln( exp( ))k kt t tk W R U N k W R U NE V X Vγ+ + += == + ∑  
where γ =0.5772 is Euler’s constant. This is for individuals working. While for 
individuals not working we have, 
 
(13) ( ){ }1 1 1, , , ,max ( ln( exp( ))k kt t tk R U N k R U NE V X Vγ+ + += == + ∑  
 
4. Estimation method 
 
In this section we discuss estimation of the parameters 
1 2( , , , , , , , , , )
r u r u wυ ρ φ α α λ λ λ θ θΓ =  of the theoretical model. An additional layer of 
complication introduced by the unobserved layoff is addressed by introducing the EM-
algorithm to maximize the log likelihood function. 
  
The current period unobserved state variable is unobserved to the econometrician and 
needs to be integrated out of the value function. The multinomial logit is the closed form 
of the extreme value type I distribution (Rust, 1994). Hence, the conditional choice 
probability for alternative j in period t takes the following form, 
 
 (14)  
( )
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−
= Γ = ∑  
 
where we have introduced the notation k|ht-1 to indicate that the sum is over the choices 
which are possible conditional on previous period’s choice. For example the decision to 
stay in the current job depends on having a job in the previous period. 
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The maximization of the likelihood function over all conditional choice probabilities is 
straightforward except for the incomplete control assumption introduced by layoffs. Let 
Lt = 1 if a layoff occurs and 0 otherwise. If we observed data for layoffs, the choice 
probability would be influenced for choices j and layoff k in the following way for 
individuals working in the previous period, 
 
 (15) [ ] ( , )( , | , ) ( | , , ) ( | , ) t tI h j L kt t t t t t t tP h j L k X P h j X L k P L k Xδ π = == = Γ = = = Γ = Γ  
 
Where Pδ is the conditional choice probability above and Pπ is the probability distribution 
for Lt, which we have specified in Section 4. Since we do not observe Lt, we cannot 
compute this probability.  
 
The formulation in (15) is a mixture of two components for the choice probabilities. The 
population is split in those experiencing a layoff and those who do not. This model can be 
estimated by maximizing the expected log likelihood function where we have integrated 
out the layoff probability conditional on the observed data.  
 
For those who were out of employment during the previous period the layoff outcome is 
obviously zero and their choice probability is not influenced by layoffs at all.  
 
For those who stay in the plant, the layoff outcome is also zero. Their choice probability 
is then as if the layoff was observed, 
 
(16) [ ] ( )( , 0 | , ) ( | , ) ( 0 | , ) tI h jt t t t t t tP h j L X P h j X P L Xδ π == = Γ = = Γ = Γ  
 
For those who experienced a separation from their plant, we need to compute the 
expected layoff probability conditional on data and the probability model. Let the 
unconditional layoff probability be πt. We can then compute the conditional layoff 
probability as, 
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 (17) [ ] ( | , )| ,
( | , ) (1 ) ( | , )
t t t
t t t
t t t t t t
P h XE X h
P h X P h X
δ
δ δ
ππ π π
Γ= Γ + − Γ
%
%  
 
where Pδ%  is the choice probability after a layoff, where  the choices are restricted to 
“retirement”, “unemployment” or “a new job”. And Pδ  is the choice probability without 
layoff, that is, choices can be “continue work”, “retirement”, “unemployment” or “a new 
job”. For a moment assume that ( ) 1tP h Wδ = =  then ( ) 0, , ,tP h j j R U Nδ = = = . It can be 
seen that the conditional layoff probability is one. The intuition is quite clear. For 
individuals, who want to stay in the plant no matter what, a separation can only be 
associated with a layoff. For clarity assume that ( ) 1tP h Rδ = =  then ( ) 1tP h Rδ = =%  and 
the conditional layoff probability is equal to the unconditional. First, this reveals that no 
information about layoffs can be drawn from this observation and second that layoffs 
occur before quits. 
 
Moreover, suppose the plant shuts down. Then the conditional layoff probability is 
independent of choice probabilities and this is also the case for newly started firms.9 
Perhaps a clearer interpretation of the conditional layoff is reached if we divide the 
numerator and the denominator by tP% . In this case we obtain the following expression, 
 
(18) | ,
(1 )(1 ( | , ))
t
t t t
t t t t
X h
P h W Xδ
ππ π π= + − − = Γ  
 
The conditional layoff probability is the layoff probability divided by the probability of 
layoff plus the quit rate.  
 
This formulation gives rise to the following likelihood contribution (taking logs of the 
choice probabilities), where we have split the contribution into, 
 a/ Those who were out of employment in the previous period 
                                                 
9 A more elegant solution would recognize that the exit probabilities and choice probabilities conditional on 
DHS should be an equilibrium condition. 
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 b/ Those who were employed at the same plant for two consecutive periods 
c/ Those who were separated from their plant either because of a layoff or because 
of a quit. 
 
a/ 
 (19a) 
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The complete log likelihood function is the sum of the three contributions conditional on 
the appropriate employment history. This expression can then be directly maximized. An 
alternative procedure is the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm of Dempster et al., 
1977, which is frequently applied in mixing models, where it is easy to maximize the 
likelihood function if the mixing components are observed. This procedure is very stable 
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but slow. The algorithm is straightforward to use in our case10 and only influence term c 
above. Instead of taking the expectations of layoff probabilities with respect to Γ, we do 
it with respect to a current guess of parameters Γt, iterate on the conditional choice 
probabilities a couple of times (note that the mixing components are fixed here) and 
obtain new parameter values Γt+1. These can be substituted into the computation of the 
mixing components. A new iteration increases the log likelihood function and so forth. 
This continues until convergence.11 
 
Estimates of covariance parameters for the parameters follow by a single iteration on the 
full maximum likelihood function after convergence. 
 
5. Data 
 
We use a 10 percent sample of Danish population from 1980-1997. The data has been 
kindly provided by the DREAM group12 in Denmark. The data are derived from the fact 
that all residents in Denmark has a social security number which is used in all 
transactions recorded including the income tax register, job centers, bank accounts, 
participation in welfare programs, and other transactions with the welfare system. 
Moreover, the data are merged with plant information.  
 
We focus on a sub-sample of private sector employees without academic degree, which 
are eligible for early retirement benefit. This is to minimize the potential influence of 
other pension schemes.13 The eligibility criteria for early retirement benefit is satisfied by 
focusing on individuals belonging to the cohorts 1925-1930, who need 5 years of UI fund 
membership to be eligible. We also removed self-employed as their disposable income is 
difficult to compute. The only retirement routes in this paper are early retirement or old 
                                                 
10 Note the EM-algorithm is a very general optimization procedure and we do only describe the way we 
have implemented it. 
11 We have chosen a fairly high convergence criterion (1e-3), which is due to the slow progress of the 
algorithm. Moreover we were often times able to calibrate the likelihood function much faster, which might 
indicate it would be a good idea with a sensitivity analysis of the likelihood function. 
12 The Dream group is a macroeconomic policy planning unit in the Ministry of Finance. 
13 A large fraction of public employees had a civil servants pension. And labour market pensions were 
widespread among academics. 
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age pensions and we remove all disability pensioners. Finally, because of the need to 
obtain estimates of firm specific human capital effects (tenure) we rely on a sample of 
individuals, who changed job during 1980 or 1981 and therefore had their tenure reset to 
zero. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the sample can be seen Table 2. The sample consists of 7,092 
observations on 431 individuals, an average of 16.4 per individual. As noted above we 
have to solve for each individual the maximization problem inside a maximum likelihood 
procedure, which in general is quite expensive. However to solve for the 16 observations 
available on average we only need one backward recursion. This saves us a lot of 
computing time compared with shorter panels, where estimates of age effects must be 
obtained from different age groups. The sample is dominated by cohabiting or married 
males. Average tenure is low as we cannot observe tenure before 1980 (see also sample 
selection). Experience – on the other hand – can be tracked back to 1964. This is actual 
experience calculated from ATP contributions. ATP is a very small supplementary labor 
market pension paid on basis of supplied hours instead of income. The mean real wage is 
DKK 65 per hour. Income on a yearly basis is DKK 123,500 assuming 1,900 working 
hours per year. The UI (and early retirement) benefit maximum is approximately 84,000. 
This implies a mean replacement rate of 0.68 for the workers in our sample. 
 
The possible choices are retirement, unemployment and full time work. The definition of 
retirement is based on the labor force status in the last week of November in a given year. 
Long-term unemployment requires a unemployment degree of at least 50% in a given 
year. Finally, work is the residual category. We re-classify a few workers as retired if 
their labor market income does not exceed pensions because the November status 
requires only very small amounts of labor market income to be classified as in work.  The 
ten most typical employment patterns are given in Table 3. As expected the full time 
work with no intervening other jobs or unemployment is most dominant, accounting for 
50 percent of the sample. The three following sequences are also straightforward. One 
sequence with a single job change and another sequence with unemployment before 
retirement, and a sequence with only fulltime work. After that the labor market histories 
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becomes more and more complex. A sequence which is very rare is the transition from 
retirement to work. Only 0.2 per cent of the individuals in our sample make a return to 
work from retirement. We allow for a transition from retirement to work, which allows us 
to estimate the cost associated with return conditional on the policy rules. 
 
6. Results 
 
In this section we discuss parameter results and fit of the model. The model was 
estimated with the EM-algorithm as discussed above. Depending on the starting values 
we frequently had difficulties with a degenerate point. The algorithm did end up in a 
point with no layoff at all. This was particular troublesome with the maximum likelihood 
algorithm, whereas the EM-algorithm in general was more stable. One possible solution 
is to estimate the wage equation jointly with the retirement model and let the quit rate 
influence the wage distribution directly.  
 
The t-ratios on the parameter estimates are quite low, which is not uncommon in the 
dynamic programming literature, despite the large number of observations. The problem 
is that the value function is correlated highly with the instantaneous utility function (Rust 
et al., 1997). As we have only used 5 per cent of our sample to estimate the model, some 
of the problems could probably be solved by increasing sample size. However, this will 
slow down an already slow estimation procedure. 
 
Finally, when we discuss fit of the model, we do it with a series of figures and tables. 
Alternatively, goodness of fit could be assessed through chi-square statistics. 
 
Parameter estimates: 
 
Table 4 provides parameter estimates and associated t-ratios for the estimated model. We 
find that leisure and consumption are substitutes (υ>0). The value might seem a little 
high. But we have not included a cost of going to work or a minimum subsistence level of 
living, which would have lowered the value. For example in Van der Klaauw et al., 2006, 
68
 25
the value is only slightly positive; but they also include a minimum subsistence level in 
their model. The CRRA, ρ, parameter estimate is fairly low but close to the findings of 
other studies, which impose the restriction that consumption equals income (Van der 
Klaauw et al., 2006).  
 
Preferences for leisure differ across taste shifters and across unemployment and 
retirement. The reference person within each state is a cohabiting14 male, αconstant. First, 
sex, αfemale, is the main difference for leisure preferences in retirement, where females 
enjoy a not very significant higher value than males. The other leisure parameters have 
very low significance. So the difference continues to exist independent of being single or 
not. Second, preferences for unemployment leisure (net of search cost) seem to vary 
across the taste shifters. Single males, αsingle, cohabiting females, αfemale, and single 
females, αsingle+αfemale+αsingle*female, have higher preferences for unemployment leisure 
compared with cohabiting males, though the difference is only slight significant for 
single males. The age effect, φ, is significant, which reflects the gradually deterioration of 
health. 
 
We find that the value of leisure is significantly higher during early retirement benefit 
and old age pension than through unemployment insurance. As the model interprets the 
difference in valuation of leisure across unemployment and retirement as search cost of 
unemployed, we can compute the implied search cost for each group. One should be 
careful in evaluating these differences and remember taste shifters are in exponential 
form. Therefore the value of search cost to married males are exp(αconstant,U)-
exp(αconstant,R), where R and U denote state. From these we see that single females have 
the largest search cost, males in couples, females in couples and finally single males.  
 
State dependence reveals the expected pattern with retirement being associated with a 
detoriation of human capital and possibly a lack of search incentives, and therefore a 
higher cost of returning to work, though the effect is not very significant. Loss of human 
                                                 
14 With “cohabiting” we mean both individuals married and not married; but living together with another 
person. 
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capital is less for the unemployed compared to retired which implies a lower cost of 
returning to work for the unemployed. It could also be that search requirements raise the 
quality of wage offers. Interestingly there is no significant difference between the cost of 
changing job for the employed and for unemployment. Given that the employed do not 
suffer a loss in human capital; the interpretation is that search is more efficient while 
unemployed. We will have to remember these effects of search cost in accessing the 
difference in valuation of leisure (net of search cost). 
 
Estimates of the layoff distribution can be seen in Figure 2 as a function of the DHS 
index. On one hand plants, which experience a considerable downsizing, the layoff 
probability is very high. On the other hand we find that it drops quickly as the DHS index 
approaches zero and that there is very small layoff probabilities in expanding plants. 
 
Model fit  
 
The estimated model can be simulated and we can compare the fit of the model with-in 
sample. For simulation of the model we use path simulations. We draw the unobserved 
state variable, the probability of death, and a probability of layoff. We use these values to 
simulate the decision for the initial age. Next periods state variables can be updated. For 
the DHS index we use the value zero in this updating. Therefore conditional on the 
simulated outcome, we simulate the decision for the next period and so on. For each 
individual we make ten simulations and average the results.  
 
Figure 3a (3b) to 6a (6b) show the fit to unemployment, retirement, work in old job and 
work in a new job by single status for males (females). Retirement in Figure 3a and 3b is 
almost nonexistent until age 60 at that age a very large increase in retirement takes place 
for both genders and for singles as well for cohabiters. Especially, the female sample 
responds very strongly to the age eligibility criteria. At age 61, 90 per cent of the females 
in the sample have withdrawn to retirement. Male in general respond slower with 80 per 
cent being retired at age 62. The model slightly over predicts early retirement and after 
that under predicts old age pension. However, overall the fit is reasonably good.  
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In Figure 4a and 4b we compare actual unemployment and simulated unemployment. The 
overall pattern is an increase in the unemployment degree by age until age 59 and then a 
very fast decline after early retirement becomes available at age 60. However, it also 
clear that the unemployment picture is more variable than for retirement. Thus it is quite 
challenging to fit these long-term unemployment states. The increase in unemployment 
around age 57 to 59 is overstated in the model. And likewise for age 60+ the model 
overstates unemployment. The problem is that the model predicts unemployment 
duration to be too long.  
 
Figures 5a and 5b for continued work in an existing job show that 80-90 per cent of 
individuals stay with their plant up from age 51 to around age 58 with a very small 
decline. The model predicts this reasonably well. After age 58 individuals start to go on 
UI benefit and retire and this reflected in the sharp decline from age 58+. The figures are 
close to the reverse of Figure 3a and 3b. Around 60 there is a sharp drop in the number of 
individuals staying in their existing job due to retirement. It is more pronounced for 
females than males.  
 
Finally, jobs in new plants are described in Figures 6a and 6b. Again the overall 
impression is that it is quite variable, which is unsurprising, as transitions out of long-
term unemployment is to a new job before the age 50. Again from age 58 the number of 
individuals in a new job decreases. 
 
In Table 5a and 5b employment transitions probabilities can be seen for age groups 52-59 
in Table 5a and for age 60+ in Table 5b. The employment transitions from new and old 
job to all other states before age 60 are reasonably well described. Though, in the data the 
transition to unemployment is higher in a new job than in an old job, which the model is 
not able to reproduce. Also the actual levels of separation from a new job to another new 
job are higher than the prediction from the model. On the other hand the number of 
transitions from an old job to a new job is slightly overstated. The same pattern between 
new and old job is repeated for the age group 60+. However, the transition to 
71
 28
unemployment is reversed in this case. Transitions out of unemployment reveal some 
greater differences. The model predicts much less outflow to a new job than the data. 
This explains a much higher unemployment rate in Figures 4a and 4b. Finally, we see 
that the transitions from and to retirement are well predicted with the model after age 60, 
but not very well before age 60. But the number of retirement sequences is extremely low 
before age 60. 
 
The results showed estimated parameter values within plausible ranges. Unemployment 
is valued less than retirement; but search lowered the value of leaving unemployment. 
The predictions of the model revealed some very interesting things. First, the model fits 
participation rates well. The exception is unemployment, which is clearly overstated. 
Second, from Table 5a and Table 5b, we saw that the model predicts too long 
unemployment spells, which explain the very high unemployment. Third, new jobs are 
more volatile in the data than the model predicts. Fourth, retirement is well predicted in 
the model. 
 
7. Experiments 
 
We have previously indicated that once preferences are estimated we are very free to 
choose a simulation experiment. In this section we simulate the outcome of two 
experiments. The first is aimed at evaluating the effects of introducing the unemployment 
related pension scheme, which we will refer to as transitional allowance 
(“Overgangsydelsen”) that was mentioned in the introduction. The second experiment 
measures the difference between the value of leisure in unemployment and in retirement 
in money equivalent units. 
 
Experiment 1: Unemployment related retirement 
 
In 1992 a new scheme, transitional allowance, for early retirement appeared in Denmark. 
It was directed towards the long-term unemployed. Such new initiatives should be 
followed by careful analysis of the incentives build into the program. With the model in 
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this paper we can introduce an unemployment related retirement program. We do this by 
implementing the details of the program and predict the outcome from the model under 
two different assumptions on preferences for leisure, which we return to below. 
 
Implementation of this scheme requires new transition equations for unemployment and 
retirement duration (equation (7) and (8)). After one period of unemployment individuals 
become eligible for transitional allowance. The benefit level is identical to UI benefit, but 
is reduced to 80% after the three periods on maximum benefit has expired. Likewise the 
Early retirement benefit will be 80% of the maximum for all years. This means a loss in 
early retirement benefit. Individuals are allowed to work but suffer a reduction in 
transitional allowance. Re-entry to UI system is possible by fulfilling the work 
requirement in the model of one period of work.  
 
First, we assume leisure time for individuals on transitional allowance is as 
unemployment. The popularity of scheme is quite limited. In Figure 8 (Simulation, T1), 
the maximum fraction of individuals on transitional allowance is 2.8 per cent at age 59. 
As we expect that unemployment might increase due to the transitional allowance 
requires an UI spell, we compare unemployment with and without transitional allowance. 
In Figure 7, we can see that they are quite identical except for the few individuals who 
leave for transitional allowance. Distortions are almost absent in this case because 
unemployment insurance clearly dominates transitional allowance. 
 
Next, we evaluate the transitional allowance under the alternative assumption that 
individuals on transitional allowance enjoy the leisure preferences of retired. Figure 7, 
simulation T2, now shows a very huge inflow to unemployment followed by a massive 
entry to the transitional allowance scheme (Figure 8, simulation T2). Moreover, there is 
an increase in the early retirement scheme at age 60, which was not present before (not 
shown). 
 
Experiment 2: Leisure in income equivalent units 
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We will in this section try to compute the willingness to pay (WTP) from the quality 
change of leisure, where the quality change comes from removing the search cost in 
unemployment by using the retirement parameters for leisure. This exercise, although not 
necessarily in discrete labour supply models, is frequently done in static random utility 
models. We can define Cij as the income compensation necessary to equate utility of 
choice i before the reform with the utility of choice j after the reform.  
 
 (20) ( ( ), , ) ( ( ) , , )t i ij t jU y i i X U y j C j Xε ε+ = − +%  
 
where U is instantaneous utility and we have used a static model with additive error term. 
The state variable X includes observed state variables as well as parameters of the utility 
function. X%  contains state variables and parameters quality adjusted. Computing 
willingness to pay in this model is detailed in McFadden (1999). Two problems are 
present in these calculations. First the error term induces a probability distribution on the 
willingness to pay and second income effects might be present in the conditional choice 
probabilities under the quality improvement and compensation.15 
 
To be able to compute the willingness to pay it is required that utility is monotone and 
increasing in income. Since our utility function is strictly increasing in income and the 
value function inherits this property (Bertsekas, 1999), we note that it directly extends to 
our dynamic model above. It would be possible to calculate these values for a change in 
quality for example for the next period or for all periods, and the willingness to pay for 
this. However, our model does not allow for transferring money across time so it is not 
obvious how to interpret the resulting willingness to pay. Instead we will calculate the 
willingness to pay for a quality change in the current period. While this is similar to the 
static analysis, we should emphasize that our model is estimated taking into account all 
the dynamic incentives of social insurance and labour market opportunities. 
 
Let us define the measure of willingness to pay in our model for individuals choosing i 
before the change and j after the quality improvement. 
                                                 
15 If utility is a nonlinear function of income or marginal utility of income differs across alternatives. 
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 (21) 
1 1( ( ), , ) ( log( exp( )) ( ( ) , , ) ( log( exp( ))
k k
t it t ij t jt t
k k
U y i i X V U y j C j X Vε β γ ε β γ+ ++ + + = − + + +∑ ∑%
 
which is identical to the static discrete choice setting except that we have included the 
expected value of future utility. A standard assumption is that the random state variable is 
invariant with respect to the quality improvement, which makes it particular easy to 
calculate the willingness to pay for individuals, who do not change alternative after the 
quality improvement and compensation. This is because the error in equation (?) drops 
out under j=i.  
 
Let us define C, the income adjustment that equates maximum utility before quality 
improvement and maximum utility after the quality adjustment, where we allow 
substitution between alternatives. It is intuitive to see that this will be bracketed by Cii 
and Ckk. On one hand the income compensation required for keeping initial utility 
constant at choice i after the quality adjustment, Cii,, must be less than C because 
individuals are allowed to substitute away from i after quality improvement and thereby 
increase ex post utility. Utility under alternative k must be higher than i after the quality 
adjustment and less is needed to equalize utilities. On the other hand C must be less Ckk 
because individuals are allowed under initial utility to choose i instead of k. Ex ante 
utility under alternative i is higher than utility for alternative k. Therefore it takes more to 
equalize utility between k and k. This argument requires only that the value functions are 
monotone and increasing in income (see McFadden, 1999, and De Palma et al., 2003, for 
a proof).  
 
We have 
 
 (22) ii kkC C C≤ ≤  
 
if case i is chosen before improvement and k after the improvement. Note that if the 
improvement – in this case value of leisure in the current period – do not influence a 
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particular choice k, Ckk must be zero. Taking expectation on both sides of this inequality, 
we get bounds on the expected compensating variation.  
 
 (23) 0 1[ ]i ii k kk
i k
P C E C P C≤ ≤∑ ∑  
 
where P0 is the conditional choice probability ex ante and P1 is the conditional choice 
probability ex post. A problem with computing these values are that the upper bound 
depends on the true income compensation in the conditional choice probability. Herriges 
and Kling, 1999, provide some computable bounds on these. Here we choose to note that 
the choice probabilities are bounded by the uncompensated choice probabilities. This is 
because the income effect present in the choice probability decreases the probabilities due 
to utility is monotone increasing in income. 
 
In Table 6 we have computed the willingness to pay for the unemployed at age 51 (results 
for other age groups show very similar willingness to pay), whom is affected by a change 
in the quality improvement of leisure. Note the characteristic of the individual only varies 
with respect to taste shifters in these calculations. This we can do by solving the non-
linear programming problem in (21). We could compute the overall population 
willingness to pay by weighting each group appropriately. Instead, we report result across 
sex and cohabitation status. The results show quite high willingness to pay for this 
improvement. The value of DKK 51,000-52,000 (after tax) should be compared with an 
unemployment benefit level after tax of approximately DKK 53,000 in 1980 DKK. As 
expected single women are willing to pay the most for this and single men the least. 
However, the differences are quite small. 
 
These values should not be taken at face value. The point is that individuals are willing to 
reduce their income to a level very close to minimum subsistence level to avoid the 
search costs of unemployment if they are unemployed. In our model the subsistence level 
is zero. In a more realistic version of the model, the subsistence level should be included.  
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By using the estimated choice probabilities we can compute bounds on the expected 
willingness to pay for avoiding search costs. This might be a more realistic measure in 
our model as the choice probabilities take into account utility derived in the other states. 
The bounds are given in Table 6 as well. They seem to be quite broad. Since we are using 
uncompensated ex-post conditional choice probabilities, the large substitution to 
unemployment after quality improvement increases the upper limit. Remember the 
theoretical correct bound should decrease income by the true willingness to pay. The 
expected willingness to pay reflects the average over the states and do therefore not 
depend on which state the individuals occupy. 
 
It should be noted that the welfare calculation depends highly on the functional form used 
for computing these measures. Something that becomes evident from the discussion on 
static random utility models. The virtue of the present calculations is of course that we 
take into account the dynamic incentives in public support to retiree and unemployed. 
 
This section has clearly shown that the distortions of early retirement benefit and 
transitional allowance can be very large. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have seen that unemployment and retirement are two distinct states 
contrary to what previous structural retirement models have presumed. The main 
conclusion is that the early retirement scheme is highly distorting incentives mainly 
because of lack of search requirements. This is even the case for a period with general 
high unemployment and therefore loose administration or enforcement of search 
requirements. 
 
We estimated a dynamic programming model with incomplete control and found 
parameter values within plausible ranges. The model predicted retirement and job 
transitions well, but was overstating unemployment. Policy simulation revealed large 
distortions from introduction of unemployment related retirement schemes. Moreover, we 
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saw that individual’s willingness to pay for abolishing search cost in unemployment was 
very large. 
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Table 1: Wage regression
Dependent variable log real hourly wage
Coefficient T-stat
Experience 0,001494 (0.66)
Experience squared -0,000168 (-3.84)
Tenure 0,0137 (10.37)
F-test (11729, 34312) 7,85 0,000
No. of observations 46045
No. of individuals 11730
Soruce: IDA and own calculations  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of estimation sample
Mean Std. Dev min max
Females 0,19 0,40 0 1
Single 0,12 0,32 0 1
log real wage 4,18 0,28 3,21 6,36
Age 60,41 5,17 50 71
Tenure 1,76 2,75 0 16
Experience 19,17 5,29 0 32
DHS 0,02 0,59 -2 2
Number of observations 7092
Number of individuals 432
Source: IDA and own calculations  
Table 3: Most typical employment histories
Sequence Per cent
FN 50,7
FWFN 14,8
FUN 6,1
F 3,9
FWFWFN 3,3
FWN 3,3
FWFWN 1,8
FUWFN 1,7
FWF 1,3
FWFUN 1,3
Other 11,8
F: Full time job, W: New full time job
U: Unemployment, N: Retirement
Source: IDA and own calculations
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Table 4: Parameter estimates
Unemployment Retirement Work Layoff probabilities
υ 0.51 θ1 1.83
(1.12) (4.31)
ρ 1.16 1.16 1.16 θ2 0.07
(6.23) (6.23) (6.23) (0.40)
αsingle 0.62 0.02
(1.4) (0.01)
αfemale 0.70 0.15
(1.96) (1.25)
αfemale*single -0.76 0.042
(-3.1) (0.46)
αconstant -1 0.87
(-2.11) (1.9)
φage 1.75 1.75
(2.22) (2.22)
I(h=w,h=r) -6
(-1.34)
I(h=w,h=u) -2.42
(-2.19)
I(h=w,h=w) -2.47
(-0.61)
Number of observations 7092
Loglikelihood 2239.9
Note: T-stat in parenthesis
Source: IDA and own calculations
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Table 5a: Employment transition probabilities, age 51-59
From To New job Old job
Unemploy-
ment Retirement
New job Actual 0,146 0,786 0,064 0,004
Predicted 0,109 0,843 0,043 0,005
Old job Actual 0,058 0,913 0,027 0,002
Predicted 0,115 0,842 0,041 0,002
Unemployment Actual 0,592 - 0,398 0,010
Predicted 0,225 - 0,672 0,103
Retirement Actual 0,714 - 0,143 0,143
Predicted 0,477 - 0,502 0,021
Table 5b: Employment transition probabilities, age 60+
From To New job Old job
Unemploy-
ment Retirement
New job Actual 0,156 0,398 0,019 0,427
Predicted 0,037 0,607 0,063 0,293
Old job Actual 0,036 0,623 0,015 0,326
Predicted 0,059 0,559 0,059 0,323
Unemployment Actual 0,078 - 0,109 0,813
Predicted 0,009 - 0,124 0,867
Retirement Actual 0,000 - 0,000 1,000
Predicted 0,000 - 0,001 0,999
Source: IDA and own calculations  
Table 6: Willingness to pay for removing search cost
WTP for unemployed
Lower bound Upper bound
Male, single 51381 11251 30550
Male, couple 51952 7729 29147
Female, single 52149 11203 36864
Female, couple 51863 12061 34971
Source: IDA and Own calculations
Expected WTP
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Source: IDA and own calculations 
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1 Introduction.
In Denmark in the 1980s, a low wage worker who had worked for six months
was entitled to thirty months of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benets at 90%
of their wage. By any standards this seems likely to distort incentives. There
are two major distortions as compared to the situation in which UI benets and
entitlement periods are much lower. First, workers who would normally work
all the time have strong incentives to cut back work substantially. Indeed, if we
allow for costs of going to work and some substitution between market goods
and home production then many (low wage) workers who worked more than
six months in any three year period were e¤ectively paying to go to work (see
Pedersen and Smith (1998)). Second, some people who would not normally be
in the labour force now have a very strong incentive to work for six months to
gain entitlement to thirty months of high benet. In this paper we consider the
e¤ect of this system on labour market behaviour by analysing the labour force
participation decisions of a sample of the Danish male population followed over
an extended time period.
The emphasis in this paper is on the need to allow for considerable het-
erogeneity in the distaste for work that is correlated with productivity when
considering the design of a UI system. Hamermesh (1980) tests the implications
of a model that accounts for UI in the workers labour supply decision. Using US
data on married women, he focuses on the e¤ects of higher benets, an increased
duration of benets and easier eligibility criteria on average weeks worked and
on the duration of unemployment. McCall (1996) examines the e¤ects of UI
on part-time work and nds a signicant e¤ect of disregard on the probability
of part-time employment during the rst three months of joblessness. Cullen
and Gruber (2000) check whether unemployment insurance substitutes for the
potential insurance role of female labor supply and nd a strong crowding-out
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e¤ect. Beker, Gruber, and Milligan (2001) evaluate the e¤ects of the Canadian
income security system for retirement, and show that the work disincentives
inherent in the system have large impacts on retirement. Saez (2002) analyzes
optimal income transfers for low incomes and concludes that the nature of la-
bor supply responses to taxes and transfers (intensity of work on the job or
participation into the labor force) is critical to design optimal income transfer
programs. Chone and Laroque (2005) study optimal taxation in an economy
where the only choice of individuals is to work or to stay out of the labor force.
Allowing for heterogeneity in productivity and tastes for work, they show how
the optimal incentive schemes depend on the underlying structure of prefer-
ences. The optimal joint design of unemployment insurance and employment
protection has also been studied by Blanchard and Tirole (2006); they show
that layo¤ taxes should be di¤erent from unemployment benets depending on
certain distortions from a benchmark model, as for example the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity across workers. Krueger and Meyer (2002) provide a
survey on the empirical evidence on the labor supply e¤ects of social insurance
programs.
Our main empirical nding is that amongst prime age single men who have
a low potential wage and a high disincentive to work, market work is the usual
state. However, a substantial fraction do not participate at all (and consequently
do not receive UI benets). Finally, a small fraction seem to play the system
and alternate long periods of unemployment with short periods of work that are
designed to re-invigorate UI entitlement. In a pure labour supply model with
labour sold on a spot market and no human capital formation, the only way to
rationalise this is by positing very substantial heterogeneity in preferences over
work relative to consumption. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the distribu-
tion of tastes for market workis bimodal. The largest group comprises those
who will work in the market even when the nancial incentives are low (they
have nearly horizontal indi¤erence curves in the usual labour supply/income
picture). The second group are the polar group who will not participate in
labour market work even for short periods with high remuneration (they have
almost vertical indi¤erence curves). Both of these rst two groups display low
labour supply elasticities. Finally, there is a third, smaller group who are in be-
tween and who display high labour supply elasticities. If this nding is correct
and heterogeneity is as diverse and as biased towards work as we nd, then this
has strong implications for the design of UI systems. Very broadly, if a large
fraction of people are willing to work even if the nancial incentives are low
and those who are out of the labour force are very reluctant to enter it, then
some of the widespread fears concerning the disincentive properties of UI are un-
founded. Our nding also calls into doubt the validity of ndings for the design
of UI programs that assume homogeneous attitudes to work (see, for example,
Baily (1977), Gruber (1997), Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997) and Wang and Williamson (1996)).
In our empirical implementation, we consider discrete labour supply choices
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for each month over a 36 month period.1 We take a sample of low education
single males for our empirical work. The selection of low educated workers (and
consequently low wage) is to isolate those who are most likely to face very high
disincentives to work due to the UI system. We consider only single males since
our theory model has preferences over labour supply and consumption and the
latter depends on other family members if we consider married males. In our
analysis we allow for heterogeneity in the taste for work that may be corre-
lated with the wage. We present results using a semiparametric estimator and
a parametric estimator. For the former, we put enough parametric structure
on individual preferences so that we can non-parametrically identify the distri-
bution of tastes conditional on wages. This identication requires that workers
can choose their desired labour supply with no constraints form the supply side
and no work requirements from the UI authorities. Even though such a strong
assumption is justiable for environment for our data period, we recognise that
actual labour supply may diverge from desired participation. One possibility is
involuntary unemployment which gives that actual employment is below desired
employment. We could also, however, have involuntary employment since the
UI rules specify that workers should take a suitable job if o¤ered one. Another
source of involuntary employment is that a job taken to ensure qualication may
last for more than six months. To allow for this we have to specify a parametric
model with a parametric assumption on the conditional distribution of tastes
for work. For this model we require that actual labour supply is close to desired
labour supply.
Section 2 provides details of the Danish UI system as it operated in our
sample period. We show that because of the UI system and the tax system, low
wage workers faced very high implicit tax rates on work; for most workers in
our sample this implicit rate was above 85%: Nonetheless, most workers worked
most of the time. This is the most important nding in our study. However,
some workers worked for much less than 36 months over our 3 year sample pe-
riod and it is this distribution that we are interested in modelling. In section 3
we present a parametric intertemporal allocation model with exible work and
borrowing and saving between periods. We allow for non-additivities between
consumption and labour supply but the main focus of interest is on an additive
distaste for workparameter which is allowed to be heterogeneous. We show
that we can partially identify the distribution of this parameter conditional on
wage if workers can achieve exactly their desired months of work.2 In section 4
we present the t of the parametric model to statistics that capture the marginal
distribution of months of work and to statistics that capture the dependence of
months of work on the wage. We do not need to present goodness of t results
1Our implicit time aggregation over a given 36 month period is imposed on us since the
period by period dynamic program for choice with constraints depending on the choices in
the preceding 36 periods (which is what is needed to model the Danish system) turns out to
be very complex (see, for example, the program in Wang and Williamson (1996) for a four
period model).
2Partial identication here means that for each worker we identify bounds on their distaste
for workparameter.
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for the semiparametric model since it ts exactly by construction (that is, it
predicts exactly the observed months of work for each observed wage). In sec-
tion 5 we consider four hypothetical reforms to the UI system, keeping the tax
system constant. These hypothetical changes either decrease the benet period
(holding the entitlement period constant) and/or reduce the benet level. We
present predictions for a range of outcomes including the unemployment rate,
the incidence of long run unemployment and the cost of the UI system. For
each of these reforms we have both parametric and semiparametric predictions.
The semiparametric estimates are in the form of bounds; one feature of our
predictions are that these bounds are very tight and usually contain the predic-
tions from the parametric model. An important modelling conclusion we draw
from this analysis is that allowing for non-additivities between consumption and
labour supply makes very little di¤erence to the results, so that in this context
it may be reasonable to consider the simple case of an additive utility function.
Our main substantive nding is that changes in the benet rate have a much
larger impact than changes in the entitlement period and a change to a US
style system (with six months of entitlement and a 45% replacement rate) would
reduce unemployment rate for our sample of low education single males from
the observed 19% to around 4%. A nal section concludes.
2 Institutions and the distribution of work and
wages.
2.1 The Danish UI and tax system.
The Danish UI system is a voluntary public system. It is administered by trade
unions, but membership of a trade union is not a prerequisite for membership
of the UI fund. Benet levels, maximum duration and search requirements are
regulated by the government and are identical across all UI funds. Despite
being voluntary, 80% of the working population are members. The government
makes a substantial contribution to the UI funds so that they are actuarially
very attractive to most workers. In Denmark in the mid-1980s eligibility for
Unemployment Insurance (UI) benet required 6 months of work within the last
36 months and membership of a UI fund. The replacement rate was 90 percent
up to a maximum benet level of DKK 104; 766 in 1984. As we shall see shortly
this maximum benet cap is low and very few workers were entitled to the top
replacement. In the 1980s the Danish economy was in a recession and active
labour market policies were in place so that individuals could stay entitled for
UI benet if they exhausted their benet. A job o¤er was provided at the end
of the UI cycle (The Economic Council, 2005). Anecdotal evidence also points
to a very low search requirement for benet receipt in this period.
The Danish tax system in our data period of 1984 1986 was individual (not
family) based. There was a at local tax of approximately 29%, which applied
to all labour (including UI benet) and capital income after an deduction of
14; 000 DKK. State taxes were highly progressive. After a deduction, which is
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Wage Wage Wage UI Replacement
Percentile (DKK) (normalised) rate
10% 7; 365 2:78 85%
25% 8; 018 3:02 78%
Median 9; 007 3:40 69%
75% 10; 378 3:92 60%
90% 12; 464 4:70 50%
Table 1: Wages and UI replacement rates
of same magnitude as the local deduction, all income was taxed by the bottom
rate of 14:4 percent. Income above 77; 550 DKK were taxed by another 14:4
percent, so that the middle tax rate was 28:8%. The top tax rate was 10:8%
and applied to incomes above 128; 450 DKK. These rates, levels and brackets
are taken as our policy parameters in the model, where we allow for the small
year to year adjustment in the system from 1984  1986, a period without large
reforms in this area.
2.2 The distribution of work and wages.
The data are compiled from various administrative registers in Denmark. In
Denmark all individuals have a personal ID number used in all type of transac-
tions: tax returns, social welfare, unemployment, job centre, banks etc. which
allows us to construct a panel census. We have a 10% random sample in 1980
and follow individuals up to 1997. From this population we draw a very ho-
mogenous sample of workers who are most likely to be a¤ected by the high
replacement rates for UI (that is, low education workers) and for whom we can
equate personal and household income (that is, single people). Specically, we
select single males with less than 10 years schooling who have no children (at
least living at home) and who are aged between 25 and 55 in 1984. We also se-
lect on income from UI, social assistance and earnings being higher than 20,000
(1980) DKK in each year. We also removed self-employed and employees in the
agriculture, shing and mining as both groups have large changes in income
from year-to-year and possibly very seasonal dependent labour supply. We also
require that there is no missing observations on covariates from 1984   1986.
We only select workers who had at least six months of work in the three years
1984   1986; this is partly to focus only on those who are eligible for UI and
partly to make sure that we can compute a monthly wage for each worker. Fi-
nally, we trimmed the sample by removing individuals in top and bottom 1%
in the wage distribution. Monthly wages are constructed from annual earnings
divided by months in the labour market over the estimation period. The nal
estimation sample size is 2; 046 individuals.
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Figure 1: Marginal tax-benet rates.
The distribution of wages and replacement rates for the sample is given
in Table 1. The normalised wage is the wage divided by the monthly social
assistance benet that a single male would receive if they had no other source
of income. One important feature the Table reveals is that the maximum UI
benet cap is very restrictive; in fact, about 4% of the sample are eligible for the
maximum replacement rate of 90%. The return to working is partly determined
by the UI system but also by the tax system. Figure 1 gives the marginal
tax-benet rates for the distribution of wages for a worker who works only six
months of the 36 and a worker who works all of the time. The values of the
marginal rates are striking: a low wage worker faces a marginal rate of about
90%; that is, for each extra 100 DKK earned by extra work, he sees an increase
of only 10 DKK in net income. For such a worker this largely reects that the
UI replacement rate is about 89%. The upwards shift in the marginal rate for
medium wage workers who work the full 36 months is where they move into a
higher tax bracket.
Given such strong disincentives to work, it is of obvious interest to see how
much people actually work. The distribution for months of work is given in
Table 2. The most striking feature of this distribution is that 40% of workers
work over the whole period and about two thirds work at least 30 months. On
the other hand, there is a signicant proportion who work less than half of the
three year period. The Table also shows the mean and standard deviation of
the log wage for each group. A clearer picture of the joint distribution of work
6
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Months Proportion (%) Mean log wage Std log wage
6  11 9:43 9:07 0:21
12  17 7:48 9:10 0:20
18  23 7:04 9:11 0:20
24  29 8:55 9:13 0:21
30  35 28:10 9:10 0:17
36 39:39 9:13 0:20
Table 2: Distribution of months
and gross wages is shown in gure 2; this is a nonparametric quantile regression
with a uniform kernel. The wage values are trimmed to avoid end e¤ects. Since
over 40% of workers at any wage level work 36 months, we present only the
bottom ve deciles. As can be seen, for all groups the median labour supply
is 34 months or above. For the lower deciles labour supply is rst increasing
sharply in wage and decreasing for higher wage workers. For the higher deciles
there are small rise at the extremes of the wage distribution with a at segment
between. The purpose of our econometric modelling below is to account for
this joint distribution using the institutional setting and the joint distribution
of wages and the distaste for work.
3 Theory and identication.
3.1 Preferences over labour supply and consumption.
We assume that preferences over consumption and labour supply are intertem-
porally additive (where we take the period to be a month) and that labour
supply in any period, d, is discrete with a value of 0 or 1. Let the within pe-
riod utility function over consumption and work be denoted u (c; d) where c is
consumption. In considering a functional form for this utility function we need
to satisfy a number of criteria. First, the dependence on consumption for xed
labour supply should not be too far from those assumed in the consumption
and savings literature; this suggests an iso-elastic or translated iso-elastic form.
Second, we do not want to unduly restrict the preference interactions between
consumption and labour supply. Although the literature is not very clear on
what the form of this dependence should be (see Browning, Hansen and Heck-
man (1999) for a review) we certainly want to allow for the possibility of costs
of going to work and (Frisch) complementarity or substitutability between con-
sumption and work. Third, we want to avoid parameterising the taste for work
in such a way that it unduly a¤ects the substitutability discussed in the last
sentence; we shall return to this later. Finally, for empirical tractability, we
want a form with a small number of unknown parameters. After considerable
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Figure 2: Bottom ve deciles of months of work.
experimentation, we took the following within period utility function:
u (c; d) =  d
 
(c  d)1 
1  
!
  d (1)
where  > 1,   0,  > 0 and c >  > 0. If the agent does not work in the
period (d = 0) then the utility function takes the iso-elastic form:
u (c; 0) =
c1 
1   (2)
In periods in which the agent does work the utility function for consumption is
a translated power function:
u (c; d) =  
 
(c  )1 
1  
!
   (3)
In terms of our analysis, the most important parameter is  which feeds directly
into the distaste for workin the sense that higher values of  denote a lower
level of utility if working (holding consumption constant). The parameter 
captures any xed costs of going to work. The parameter  is required to allow
exibility in the link between preferences over consumption and labor supply. If
we set  = 1 and then intertemporal preferences over labour supply are linear
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and additive between consumption and labour supply, which would violate the
second criterion above. Setting  = 1 and allowing  > 0 does give a non-
additive form, but then all of the the interactions come only through a xed
cost, which seems restrictive. The parameter  governs how complementary
consumption is with labour supply, with values of  < 1 giving higher comple-
mentarity. Thus di¤erent values of (; ) allow that the preference interactions
between consumption and labour supply can vary from low wage workers to high
wage workers in a exible way. The parameters  and  also partly govern the
distaste for work but we do not want to use these parameters to have a primary
role in this (that is, setting the additive distaste parameter, , to zero) since
this would introduce a spurious connection between the relative consumption
levels when employed or unemployed and tastes for work.
In our data we do not observe consumption in market work periods and pe-
riods of unemployment so we cannot hope to credibly estimate the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion parameter nor the parameters that control the complemen-
tarity of labour supply and consumption, (; ). There is no consensus in the
literature on these parameters (see Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999)) so
we take reasonablevalues that we use to assess the sensitivity of our estimates
to the choice of these parameters. For the CRRA parameter we take a value of
3; this is a widely used value in the consumption literature. We set  , the xed
costs of going to work, to be 20% of net income for the lowest wage worker in
our sample. In our case this gives  = 0:69. Finally we choose the  parameter
to be 1:1 so that labour supply and consumption are (Frisch) substitutes, net of
the xed costs. expenditures in unemployed periods are about 10% lower than
in employed periods for the highest wage person. Setting  > 1 means that the
mue in unemployed periods exceeds the mue in employed periods if there are no
xed costs of being employed ( = 0).:
u (c; 0) =   1
2c2
u (c; 1) =   1
23 (c  )2    (4)
which has three unknown parameters: (;  ; ). This utility function is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in consumption, for xed labour supply. Work
and consumption are dened to be (Frisch) complements if uc (c; 1) > uc (c; 0)
(the marginal utility of consumption is higher when in work); a su¢ cient con-
dition for this is  > 0 and   1.
We now turn to intertemporal allocation. Consider a series of L periods
(where L is relatively small so that, for ease of notation, we take the discount
rate and the real rate to be equal to zero). The agent has income Y to allocate
over the L periods and works forM periods and takes L M periods of non-work.
An optimal program has the same level of consumption in all work periods, c1,
and the same within all non-work periods, c0. It is more convenient to solve
everything in per period terms so let m = M=L (so that 0  m  1) and
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y = Y=L. Then the (mean) indirect utility function is given by:
V (y;m) = max
c0;c1

mu (c1; 1) + (1 m)u (c0; 0)
subject to mc1 + (1 m) c0 = y

(5)
This indirect utility function and the functional form (4) provide the basis for
our empirical analysis. The optimal values for c0 and c1 satisfy the usual Euler
condition that the agent keeps the marginal utility of consumption constant3 :
uc (c^1; 1) = uc (c^0; 0)
) c^0 =  (c^1   )
Substituting in the budget constraint from (5) we have:
c^0 =
y  m
m+ (1 m)
c^1 =
y + (1 m)
m+ (1 m) (6)
Note these consumption levels are independent of the additive parameter ,
which fullls the third of our criteria listed above. If both utility functions are
iso-elastic ( = 0) then workers spend more in work periods than in non-work
periods if and only if  < 1. The associated indirect utility function over income
and labour supply is given by:
V (y;m) = m
(
 1
23 (c^1   )2
)
+ (1 m)
(
 1
2 (c^0)
2
)
 m
=

m+  (1 m)
3
(  1
2 (c^1   )2
)
 m (7)
where c^0 and c^1 are given by equation (6). Note that if we take the additive
case with  = 1 and  = 0 then we have:
V (y;m) =
 1
2y2

 m (8)
The indirect utility function given in (7) is analogous to the utility function
taken in staticlabour supply analysis which is dened over income and labour
supply. Note, however, that our form allows for many periods and also allocation
between di¤erent blocks of L periods if y includes saving or dissaving between
blocks.
When considering the choice of the proportion of time to work, m, we need
to allow that net income depends onm. Denote this by y = y (m). This function
3Assuming that the interest rate and the discount rate are equal and that the agent can
save and borrow at the xed interest rate.
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depends on the gross wage, the tax system and the UI system. The optimal
level of labour supply is given by:
m^ = argmax
m
fV (y (m) ;m) subject to 0  m  1g (9)
If the net income function y (m) is continuous, a maximum always exists. If
y (m) is smooth and the optimum is interior (0 < m < 1) then this gives the
conventional rst order conditions:
 Vm
Vy
= y0 (m) (10)
where the left hand side is the marginal rate of substitution and y0 (m) is the
marginal real wage. In general, however, the mapping from work to income
will be non-di¤erentiable so that we need to take into account mass pointsin
our empirical work; we return to this in the next subsection.
Although our parameterisation has been chosen according to a number of
criteria, the values of  do not have any immediate interpretation. We thus
dene the distaste for work, , to be the proportional increase in income that
is needed if the agent is moved one percent away from their preferred labour
supply:
 =
d ln y
d lnm
jV=

dy
dm
jV

m
y
=  Vm
Vy
m
y
(11)
If we have an interior solution then equation (10) gives:
 = y0 (m)
m
y
(12)
For corner solutions, we must use (7). If preferences are additive ( = 1;  = 0)
the distaste for work is given by:
 = my2 (13)
In this case, the distaste for work is increasing in work and income. More
importantly, the distaste for work is increasing in the parameter . For the
general case,  is a¢ ne in  with a positive slope (so long as  is small relative
to y).4
3.2 Identication.
We now turn to the relationship between choices made using (5) and hetero-
geneity in the taste for work in the presence of a non-linear transfer system. We
consider a transfer system with a cycle length of 36 months and a UI entitlement
period of 6 months. That is, the agent is eligible for UI if they have worked
6 of the previous 36 months. Let w be the per period gross monthly earnings
4The explicit equation is too long to present here; the cacluations leading to this conclusion
were made with Maple.
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(wage) in work,  be the UI replacement rate (so that  2 [0; 1]). We have
the following mapping from the number of periods of work to net income for
everyone with M  6:
Y = 	(w (M + (36 M) )) (14)
where 	(:) is the tax system that converts gross earnings over L periods into
net income.5 Consider, for example, a worker who has enough months of work
to entitle them to UI. For this worker we assume that the wage is constant over
the L periods and the value, w, is equal to the mean observed gross wage (that
is, gross labour income divided by M). Our goal is to nd the distribution of
heterogeneity conditional on wages, f (jw). Once we have this then we can
compute outcomes for any new policy (for UI or for the tax system or for a
combination) that maps work and gross wages to net income. In our empirical
work we take the Danish tax and benet system described in section 2. This
gives a net income function that is strictly increasing and continuous but non-
di¤erentiable in gross income for a given wage.
We adopt two approaches to estimating the preference parameters, one fully
parametric and the other semiparametric. The advantage of the semiparametric
approach is that it ts the data exactly. The disadvantages are that it requires
stronger assumptions concerning the slippage between desired work and ob-
served work (details are given below) and it only gives intervals for outcomes
in out hypothetical policy simulations. The advantage of the fully parametric
approach is that it gives a functional form for the dependence of taste para-
meters on wages which allows us to conduct out of sample predictions. The
disadvantage is that we have to make assumptions about the functional form of
f (jw).
We use somewhat di¤erent identication assumptions for the two approaches.
Denote the observed proportion of months of work for worker h by mh. The
model in the previous subsection gives desired labour supply, m^h, given a wage
wh, the tax and benet system (	(:) and ) and the utility parameters (;  ; ).
For the semiparametric estimation scheme our principal assumption is a strong
one that that agents are unconstrained in their choice:
Axiom 1 mh = m^h.
We do not have direct evidence for or against the assumption that workers could
work a good deal less than the maximum if they wished. We note, however,
that over the several years in which the UI scheme in Denmark took the form
described here, many workers did achieve close to a 6=30 work/UI plan over
several years (so that it was feasible for some workers). Moreover, anecdotal
evidence suggests that work tests were not enforced with any rigour for our
selected sample of low education, low wage males. More importantly for re-
search purposes; it is of interest to consider the benchmark case in which work
requirements do not have any e¤ect, so that moral hazard is maximised.
5When we compute this in our empirical work we take the most advantageous patterns
for labour supply for net income purposes. Since workers face a progessive tax system this
usually means spreading the periods of unemployment across the three tax years.
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The assumption that the observed choice is the optimal choice (mh = m^h)
rules out frictions such as involuntary unemployment (Mh < m^h). It also rules
out any availability for worktest for unemployed workers. If workers have to
take jobs and these are available then we may have mh > m^h. In our fully
parametric estimation approach we make limited allowance for such frictions.
Specically, our identifying assumption is that if a worker wanted to work a
good deal less than the maximum (m^ << 36) then he could do so (m << 36),
even if the actual work is not quite equal to the desired value. Conversely, if
the worker wished to work the maximum (m^ = 36) then he could nd enough
work to be close to this. This is captured by
Axiom 2 The agent is approximately unconstrained in their choice: mh ' m^h.
We shall make clear the approximation in the empirical section, but it allows for
involuntary unemployment (m^h = 36 and mh < 36) and hence gives a rationale
for the insurance function of the UI system.
We now consider nonparametric identication of the distribution of the prin-
cipal parameter which governs labour supply, . Since we are considering a
discrete choice model (M = 6; 7:::35; 36) we shall only be able to identify sets
for the latent parameters. We use the indirect utility function given in (7),
V (y;m; ) where we show the explicit dependence on the preference parameter
. For a given pair of preference parameters (; ) and a given wage wh we
dene a rationalising  value, ^h, by:
argmax
m
V

y;m; ^h

= mh (15)
For various values of (; ), wh and the tax and benet system, there may not
be any values of  which satisfy this condition. In general it is di¢ cult to write
down su¢ cient conditions for ^h to exist. In our empirical work we found that
for the additive case ( = 1 and  = 0) the sets of ^h were always non-empty
for every (wh;mh). Even more conveniently, these sets always turned out to be
intervals of the form

minh ; 
max
h

. If the worker is in work for the whole three
years ( m = 1) then minh = 0. Conversely, if the worker is only employed for 6
months (the minimum in our selected sample) then we have maxh =1.
For the fully parametric estimation we shall take a parametric form for
f (jw). Specically we assume that the distribution is a mixture of two log-
Normals in which both the means and variances of the component logNormal
and the mixing parameter depend on the log wage.6 Specically we take the
6We tried many other distributions (for example, the generalised gamma). The distribution
used here gave the best t. A single logNormal is decisively rejected by the data.
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following 10 parameter conditional distribution:
1 = exp (11 + 12 ln (w) + exp(13 + 14 ln (w))U)
2 = exp (21 + 22 ln (w) + exp(23 + 24 ln (w))U)
 =
exp (1 + 2 ln (w))
1 + exp (1 + 2 ln (w))
 = 1 with probability 
= 2 with probability (1  ) (16)
where U is a standard Normal random variable.
4 Results for the parametric model.
We estimate the parametric model above using Simulated Minimum Distance
(SMD)7 . To implement this estimator we need to specify auxiliary parameters
(aps) that are used to match the observed data and simulated data. We have
two sets of aps. The rst set of 5 aps describes the univariate distribution of
the months of work. Specically we take the proportions with months in the
intervals [6; 12) ; [12; 18) ; [18; 24) ; [30; 36] and the aggregate unemployment rate
for our sample over the three years. The focus on intervals allows for frictions
as in assumption 2. In particular, pooling all those who have between 30 and
36 months of work allows for short spells of involuntary unemployment amongst
those who would prefer to work all the time. The second set of 6 aps captures
the dependence of the rst two moments of the months of work on the wage.
Specically we regress months on a constant, the log wage (centred on zero) and
the squared log wage and record the three parameters, denoted (1; 2; 3). We
then take the OLS residuals, square them and regress them on the same three
variables to capture the conditional heteroskedasticity; we denote these three
coe¢ cients by (1; 2; 3). We use a nonparametric bootstrap to calculate an
estimate of the covariance matrix for these aps. In Table 3 we present the
means and the 95% condence bands for the aps. As can be seen, the regression
results indicate that the mean months are increasing in the wage (1 < 0) and
the dispersion is decreasing (1 > 0).
As discussed in the previous section, the conditional distribution of the dis-
taste for work parameter, , is modelled as a mixture of two logNormals. For
SMD we have to replicate the H workers in our sample. This involves a trade-o¤
between precision and speed. Since the simulation involves a maximisation step
for each worker it is relatively slow and we take only one replication with an an-
tithetic second draw. To do this we rst draw two H-vectors of pseudo-random
7This estimator is often known as indirect inference (Gouriéroux, Monfort and Renault
(1993), Gouriéroux, C. and A. Monfort, (1996)). We take the more descriptive term SMD
used in Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Hall and Rust (2003).
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numbers:
u  N (0; 1)
s  U [0; 1] (17)
We then take a second replication with antithetic values  u and (1  s). Thus
we have 2H workers in our simulated data set. Taking antithetic draws is a
conventional procedure to reduce the variance of the estimator and to stabilise
the optimisation routine when we have a small number of replications. For given
parameters and wage, we simulate the distribution given in (16) by:
d = 1 if
exp (1 + 2w)
1 + exp (1 + 2w)
> s
= 0 otherwise (18)
 = d  exp (11 + 12 ln (w) + exp(13 + 14 ln (w))u) +
(1  d)  exp (21 + 22 ln (w) + exp(23 + 24 ln (w))U) (19)
where w now denotes the log wage. Given values for (; ) we use this  value in
the indirect utility function ((7) and (6)) and nd the optimal months of work
for a given worker (w; ). We then calculate the aps for the (2H  2) matrix
of wages and months. Since we have 11 aps and 10 parameters we have one
degree of overidentication.
The last two columns of Table 3 present the t of the parametric model with
consumption and labour supply additivity imposed ((; )=(1; 0)) and with the
non-additive model with (; )=(1:1; 0:69). The most important feature of the
two sets of estimates is that the additive model ts very well and the non-
additive model less well, but still adequately.
The parameter values for the two sets of estimates are of little interest and
we do not present them. Of more interest is the distribution of . The marginal
distribution for the additive model is shown in gure 3. As can be seen, the two
mixing distributions are very di¤erent. The rst has mixing distribution has a
high mode and a low variance whereas the second has a low mode and a high
variance. The consequent mixed distribution is close to being bimodal which
explainsthe decisive rejection of the single logNormal model. The probability
of being in the rst distribution is sharply increasing in the wage so that low wage
workers have s that are drawn form the more dispersed mixing distribution.
5 Policy simulations
The principal virtue of a structural approach is that we can consider the e¤ects
of policies that have never been implemented. In this section we consider three
alternative policy scenario. In these we keep the qualifying period at six months
and vary the benet period and the maximum replacement rate. The policies
are:
Thus in policy 1 we leave the benet level unchanged but now a worker is
entitled to only 12 months of UI benet for each six months of work. Policies
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Auxiliary Condence Parametric model t
parameter Mean interval Additive Non-additive
[6; 12) months 10:1 8:8 11:3 9:1 11:2
[1:0] [ 1:3]
[12; 18) months 7:3 6:3 8:4 6:6 8:4
[1:0] [ 1:5]
[18; 24) months 7:3 6:2 8:4 7:7 6:6
[ 0:6] [0:9]
[30; 36] months 66:3 64:3 68:3 67:0 65:5
[ 0:5] [0:5]
Unemployment rate 19:1 17:9 20:2 18:2 20:1
[1:0] [ 1:2]
1  73:0  113  32:5  88:0  128
[0:5] [1:9]
2 86:5 51:1 122 99:9 135
[ 0:5] [ 1:9]
3  18:0  25:8  10:4  20:9  28:6
[0:5] [1:9]
1 12:6 8:2 17: 12:7 17:7
0 [ 0:0] [ 1:7]
2  9:8  13:6  6:0  9:9  14:0
[0:0] [1:5]
3 2:0 1:2 2:8 2:0 2:9
[ 0:0] [ 1:5]
2 (1) OI test - - - 4:4 9:9
The value in [:] is the t-value for the di¤erence of the tted value
from the observed value for the auxiliary parameter.
Table 3: Auxiliary parameters and parametric t
Policy Benet period Replacement rate
Current 30 months 90%
1 12 months 90%
2 12 months 60%
3 6 months 45%
Table 4: Alternative policies
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Figure 3: The distribution of .
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1 to 3 are increasingly less generous(policy 4 is akin to the US UI system).
We shall present three sets of predictions. The rst are the bounds from the
partially identied additive model. The second and third are the point predic-
tions from the additive and non-additive parametric models, respectively. We
present results for six outcomes: our choice of outcome variables is motivated
partly by the perceived policy concerns of nance ministers and those concerned
with the functioning of the labour market and partly by the welfare of the work-
ers themselves. Specically we consider: the unemployment rate for this group
of workers; the proportion of long term unemployed amongst the unemployed8 ;
UI benets paid; gross earnings; net income (including UI benets) accruing to
the sample and the total taxes paid. The units for the last four of these are
all in millions of 1980 DKK but only their relative magnitudes are of any inter-
est. It would be desirable to consider a broader social welfare function for this
group, but that would require taking a stand on how changes in government net
receipts (taxes minus UI benets paid) are re-distributed to the group, which
we are reluctant to do since this requires considering changes in tax policy.
Table 5 presents the predictions. For each outcome there are three rows.
The rst gives the bounds from the partially identied additive model and the
second and third rows give the point predictions from the parametric models.
The rst column gives the predictionsfor the current policy; for the partially
identied model this is, of course, the actual value calculated from the data
since this model ts perfectly whether we take the upper or lower bounds on
. One general point to note about the predictions in Table 5 is that for the
bounds from the partially identied models are very tight; this is in contrast to
many partially identied models. A second point to note is that the estimates
for the non-additive parametric model are generally quite close to those for the
additive parametric model. This suggests that the predictions if we make large
changes to the UI system are insensitive to sensibleassignments of values for
the nuisancepreference parameters (that is,  and  in 1). Finally, the predic-
tions from the additive parametric model are usually outside the bounds for the
partially identied additive model but this is largely because the predictions for
the current policy are di¤erent.
Turning to policy 1 we see that shortening dramatically the benet period
(from 30months to 12months) has little impact on any of the outcomes. Indeed,
the proportion of long term unemployed is una¤ected since the proposed policy
change impacts only those who take at least 12 months of unemployment under
the current policy. The most signicant change is in the unemployment rate and,
consequently, the UI benets paid out. Policy 2, which lowers the replacement
rate as well as the benet period, has much more impact. The unemployment
rate is cut by two thirds and UI benets paid are massively reduced. Moreover,
gross earnings increase by about 10% which represents a considerable increase
in output. On the other hand, net income for this group of workers does not rise
very much so that many of them would be worse o¤ under this new policy, some
8Strictly, the proportion who have 12 months or more unemployment relative to the pro-
portion who have at least one month of unemployment.
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Policy
Outcome Current 1 2 3
Unemployment 19:1 [18:1; 18:3] [5:5; 6:2] [2:3; 3:2]
rate (%) 18:2 17:3 5:9 2:6
20:1 19:0 7:4 2:4
Proportion of 41:9 [41:9; 41:9] [38:3; 39:0] [35:2; 38:0]
long term 45:5 45:5 27:1 24:1
unemployed (%) 50:1 50:1 33:3 22:5
100 [95:9; 95:9] [29:0; 32:8] [12:2; 16:7]
UI benets paid 100 95:0 32:3 14:1
100 94:6 36:9 12:1
100 [101; 101] [114; 115] [118; 119]
Gross earnings 100 101 113 118
100 101 113 121
100 [100; 100] [101; 102] [102; 103]
Net income 100 100 102 102
100 100 102 103
100 [100; 100] [104; 104] [107; 107]
Total taxes paid 100 100 104 106
100 100 104 107
The rst row for each outcome are the bounds
from the additive partially identied model.
The second row is for the additive parametric model.
The third row is for the non-additive parametric model.
Table 5: Policy outcomes
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considerably so.9 Moving to something close to a US system, policy 3, leads to
even lower unemployment and UI benets with an even grater increase in gross
earnings. At this point it may be thought that we have moved too far outside
sample and that the values predicted are implausibly low. Finally, policy 4
goes the opposite direction to the other three and makes the current system
even more generous in terms of the benet rate. As can be seen, the predicted
results are catastrophic. Almost half of workers simply work the minimum 6
months and output (gross earnings) collapses. Of course, no one is worse o¤
under the new policy but this is at considerable cost to whoever is nancing
the UI system (as can be seen taxes raised from this group do not even cover
payments made through UI).
6 Conclusions.
We have investigated the supply of labour if agents face the very generousUI
system that existed in denmark in the mid-1980s. Our most important nding
is the simplest: despite facing very high implicit tax rates, most of our sample
of low educated single males work most of the time. Even so, the average
unemployment rate for this group over the period 1984   1986 is 19%. We
present a parametric and semiparametric analysis of the data that allows for
heterogeneity in the tasets for work that is correlated with the wage. Given
these etimates we simulate the responses to a series of deceasingly generous
hypothetical policies. We draw the same conclusions from all of our estimates:
the outcomes fo interest are much more sensitive to cuts in the replacement
rate then to decreases in the entitlement period. Introducing a US style system
would have cut unemployment in our group of low educated single males from
19% to aroung 3%.
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